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Abstract
Auctions are an ancient economic institution. Since Vickrey (1961), the
development of auction theory has lead to an extremely detailed description
of the often desirable characteristics of these simple selling procedures, in
the process explaining their enduring popularity. Given the pervasiveness
of auctions, the question of how a seller should engineer the rules of these
mechanisms to maximize her own profits is a central issue in the organization
of markets. The seminal paper of Myerson (1981) shows that when facing
buyers with Independent Private Values (IPVs) a standard auction with a
specifically selected reserve price (or prices) is optimal, that is, maximizes a
seller’s expected profits among all conceivable selling mechanisms. In this
model, it is assumed that the buyers have perfect information as to the
existence of gains from trade. We shall argue that the consequences of this
assumption for the design of the optimal auction are not well understood,
which motivates our analysis.
The three essays of this thesis relax the ‘known seller valuation’ assump-
tion by examining the optimal auction program when the seller (and prin-
cipal) holds private information representing her reservation value for the
good. In the first essay we provide an original technique for comparing ex
ante expected profits across mechanisms for a seller facing N ≥ 1 potential
buyers when all traders hold private information. Our technique addresses
mechanisms that cannot be ranked point-by-point through their allocation
rules using the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. We find conditions such that
the seller’s expected profits increase in the slope of each buyer’s allocation
probability function. This provides new intuition for the fact that a princi-
pal does not benefit from holding private information under risk neutrality.
Monopoly pricing induces steep probability functions so the seller/principal
benefits from announcing a fixed price, and implicitly her private informa-
tion. An application is presented for the well known k double auction of the
bilateral trade literature.
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In the second and third essays of this thesis, we extend the above frame-
work to allow for informational externalities. Specifically, we allow for the
situation in which the seller’s private information represents a common value
component in buyers’ valuations. Thus the seller’s private information (say
regarding the quality of the good) is of interest to bidders independently
of any strategic effects. In recent work Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) have
demonstrated that a seller who holds private information about the quality
of a good faces an extra consideration in designing an auction; the reserve
price signals information to bidders. In a separating equilibrium signalling
is costly in the sense that reserves are higher than would be optimal under
complete information. We examine the returns to the seller in an English
auction from using different types of secret reserve regimes. We find that
immediate disclosure of a reserve is preferable to announcement after the
auction in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the winning bidder. Sale
occurs less often during the auction for a given reserve price strategy under
secret reserve regimes, which increases the incentive for the seller to report
more favourable information though the reserve price offer. Separating equi-
libria involving later announcement therefore generate even lower expected
profits to the seller (signalling is more costly) than under immediate disclo-
sure.
In the third essay we compare the benchmark signalling equilibrium of
immediate disclosure to a screening regime which we call the Right of Re-
fusal. In this extreme form of a secret reserve the seller never announces
the reserve price, she simply accepts or rejects the auction price. We find
that the Right of Refusal dominates immediate disclosure if the seller’s val-
uation is a sufficient statistic for the private information of interest. Thus a
seller with market-relevant private preference information can benefit from
not exercising monopoly price setting power. The result also provides con-
ditions under which a competitive screening equilibrium is more efficient
than a signalling mechanism. Broadly speaking, screening is better when
the common value aspect in the preferences of the informed and uninformed
parties are ‘aligned’, and potential gains from trade to the uninformed party
are significant. We believe this conclusion to be of particular interest to the
design of privatization schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature
The organization of markets is arguably the most fundamental economic
problem. In deregulated markets, this question becomes considerably more
focused; how should a seller design a trading mechanism in order to max-
imize her profits? Under complete information the solution is almost en-
tirely described by the characteristics of supply, i.e. where the market lies
on the spectrum from perfect competition to monopoly. Incomplete infor-
mation changes the structure of this problem by restricting the extent of
competition between sellers (since buyers face search costs), and provid-
ing potential surpluses to the buyers even under price discrimination (since
their willingness-to-pay is private information). As a result of these con-
siderations, auctions have become a powerful abstraction in the analysis of
markets.
Auctions provide the necessary structure to represent the informational
constraints of thin, high-search-cost or differentiated product markets . In
most formalizations, buyers are subject to the supply decisions of a price-
discriminating monopolist. The monopolist on the other hand is dealing
with a fixed finite group of buyers with different preferences for the good.
While she is aware of some limited properties of market demand such as
the distribution of buyer valuations, the monopolist cannot observe their
realizations. These markets can then be modeled as games of incomplete
information with a fixed number of players in the sense of Harsanyi (1967).
The application of the Bayesian equilibrium concept to this problem has lead
to significant advancements not only in economic theory, but in the design
of markets in practice, from electricity scheduling to the sale of natural
resources, privatization and the organization of financial markets.
It is difficult to overstate the growth of interest in auction theory and
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the breadth of its application in the last 15 years. The global movement
toward privatization of state-owned assets has seen a number of theorists
involved in both the design of the sale procedure and its execution through
bidding consultancies. In 1993-94 the format of the FCC’s radio spectrum
auction was significantly influenced by the advisory contributions of Preston
McAfee, Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson. Similarly in Britain, Ken Bin-
more and Paul Klemperer’s input in the design of the 3G telephony auctions
in 2000 helped raise US$34 billion in revenue.1 Arguably the popularity of
auctions as a means of allocating assets has been encouraged by the in-
creasing body of theoretical research that casts doubt over the central tenet
of the Chicago school; that efficiency is inevitable under ordinary market
forces. When preference information is private, the logic of the Coase theo-
rem is violated, and a secondary market will generally be inefficient.2 Thus
the initial allocation serves as a crucial factor in determining whether gains
from trade will be exhausted.3 Auctions help to alleviate these concerns
by introducing competitive pricing which, as Al Gore noted in his address
during the FCC auctions, is likely to put assets “into the hands of those who
value them the most.”4
Of course, this logic is not without loss of generality. Any criticism
than can be leveled at a secondary market on efficiency grounds can also
be directed at the initial allocation, unless the existence of gains from trade
between buyers and the seller is common knowledge, or is made irrelevant
by a commitment to sell.5 Maskin (2004) (pp. 1104) in reviewing Milgrom
(2004) describes the problem as stemming from property rights. Ownership
introduces a use value for the seller which is inevitably private information;
“there exists no nonconfiscatory mechanism...capable of attaining efficiency
once the assets are in private hands”. The findings of Cramton, Gibbons,
1While this is a testament to the power of auctions, auction theory has a delicate
structure. In Britain, as in the FCC auctions, the contributing theorists argued strongly
that a complete understanding of all facets of the asset, the market and the players were
vital to these successes, see Binmore and Klemperer (2002).
2The logic follows from the famous Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (see Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983)) which we discuss in Section 1.2.
3This argument and the importance of auction design that it connotes are elegantly
put forth in Milgrom (2004).
4See again Milgrom (2004).
5In fact, even without such complications asymmetries between buyers can create in-
efficiencies in an auction that cannot be redressed by a secondary market. Krishna and
Hafalir (2008) show that a first-price auction without a reserve price; a mechanism that is
inefficient under asymmetry; remains inefficient even when a secondary market is added
in which the bids from the auction are public information.
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and Klemperer (1987) lay bare the constraint that property rights intro-
duce. While a partnership of N ≥ 2 can be dissolved efficiently (even when
valuations are private) if no player owns too large an initial share, their
Proposition 2 proves that no single-owner initial allocation can be efficiently
dissolved.6 If there is any possibility that gains from trade do not exist
between the seller and buyers, and a seller does not eliminate this concern
ex ante7 an auction or any other mechanism will be inefficient. Further, the
situation in which there is uncertainty as to the existence of gains from trade
is arguably closer to the norm, given that a commitment to sell in every re-
alization will only occur under extreme financial or political duress.8 The
extension to allow two-sided private information is therefore an important
one. While the effect of this generalization on the efficiency objective has
been adequately explained by the literature, this thesis will show that the
players’ priors regarding the existence of gains from trade are also influen-
tial for the optimality of the mechanism. We now review the foundations of
auction theory and its relation to the design of optimal selling mechanisms
as will be studied in this thesis.
1.1 Early Developments in Auction Theory
Auction theory has its genesis in the seminal work of Vickrey (1961),
who analyzed equilibrium behaviour in first-price (Dutch) and second-price
(English) auctions. Vickrey’s crucial insight was that a bidder’s problem is
not only strategic but informational; she is competing against other bidders
whose actions, as well as the preference information that informs them are
unknown. His analysis revealed phenomena such as the dominance of truth-
ful bidding in second-price auctions and revenue equivalence that were only
to be fully understood 20 years later.
6As always, the type with the lowest interim utility is the type who does not expect
to trade. However, partial ownership means that this type expects to retain her original
share, and so has an ‘average’ valuation (in a sense that is dictated by the allocation rule).
The IR constraint is less problematic here than in the single owner case because the lowest
utility type experiences zero trade only on average. She earns profits if the types of others
are higher or lower than expected, as opposed to the lowest type of a defined seller or
buyer who never trades at all.
7Say by using a format in which the highest bidder wins and there is no reserve price.
8Privatization would be the most likely exception, although it is still hard to envisage
a situation in which state assets would be sold at any price. Presumably the asset would
have to have negative value to the state, in which case there would likely be few willing
buyers.
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As would be expected for a first investigation, Vickrey’s work can be
regarded as analytically positive, in the sense that he was concerned with
explaining the properties of given auction forms. This scheme was broadly
followed for some time, albeit using slightly more sophisticated methods.
For example, Riley and Samuelson (1981) proved revenue equivalence in the
common auction forms for general distribution functions, while Holt (1980)
and Maskin and Riley (1984) demonstrated the failure of such equivalence
under risk aversion. While certainly important, early advances in auction
theory were somewhat piecemeal, where the characteristics of equilibria in
the common auction forms were derived in increasingly general settings.9
This was all to be changed by the path-breaking work of Myerson (1981).
Myerson’s use of the Revelation Principle and characterization of incen-
tive compatibility facilitated general statements about utilities, expected
payments and allocation probabilities in equilibrium across the space of all
conceivable selling mechanisms. Remarkably, these results are contingent
on just two conditions; statistical independence and risk neutrality. My-
erson derived the most celebrated result in auction theory; the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem, which states that any two mechanisms with the same
allocation rule differ by at most a constant in terms of their expected rev-
enues.10 He then showed that under symmetry any of the common auction
forms with a suitably selected reserve price implement the optimal auction,
that is, maximize the seller’s expected profits.11 In the Myerson model, any
a priori competitive effects between buyers and the seller are effectively as-
sumed away in order to concentrate on the relationship between the ordering
of bidders and the pricing rule.
The focus of auction theory today is still very much on the behaviour of
bidders under different auction forms, valuation/information structures and
9The exception is Wilson (1967, 1969) who introduced the ‘mineral rights’ model, which
proved to be a crucial development. In the general form of this model bidders hold private
information that is a noisy signal of the object’s true common value. This was to lay the
foundations for the general interdependent values, affiliated signals model developed in
the classic paper of Milgrom and Weber (1982a), which we discuss later.
10The importance of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem in the framework of auction
theory notwithstanding, Milgrom (2004) (Chapter 3) emphasizes that the result is really
a corollary of what he calls Payoff Equivalence, which can be demonstrated using the
integral form of Hotelling’s Lemma. Further, the intuition does not require private values.
His Theorem 3.5 proves that Payoff Equivalence holds under interdependent valuations
provided signals are independently distributed. A similar form of this result and its
application to our analysis are discussed in Section 1.4.
11Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) give a similar result for a single buyer, but in a less
general setting.
4
risk preferences, and relating these to the efficiency or revenue objective.
The seller’s role in this process is usually seen as passive, or at least non-
competitive.12 The seller facilitates the sale, and having voluntarily chosen
to do so, it is presumed that, from the perspective of the participating buy-
ers, gains from trade are known to exist. Because (or perhaps symptomatic)
of this, most models assume, as did Myerson, that the seller’s reservation
value is public information. A striking feature of the optimal auction is that
despite this restriction, and indeed the one-shot setting, the asset is withheld
from the market with positive probability.13 We argue in this chapter that
the relationship between the optimal auction solution and this assumption
has not been adequately explained by the literature, which motivates our
contribution.
The majority of this thesis is dedicated to the relaxation of the ‘known
seller valuation’ assumption. We investigate the influence of private seller
information on optimal auction design in various theoretical and applied
environments. The existing literature (see Williams (1987)14) suggests that
allowing private seller information will not change the first-best solution in
the IPV setting; the optimal auction of Myerson will remain optimal. The
first part of our analysis will explain this phenomenon, and use these ob-
servations to present new results for auction design under two-sided private
information in settings in which the first-best design cannot be implemented.
Given this objective, it is instructive to first review the relevant results from
bilateral trade. These models study the link between gains from trade and
strategic considerations through a model in which two parties, buyer and
seller, attempt an exchange when both hold private information as to their
perception of an object’s value. We now discuss this literature.
12For a thorough summary of the state of modern auction theory, see Krishna (2002).
By contrast, Milgrom (2004) derives the central results by appealing to more general
results from demand theory.
13Bulow and Roberts (1989) explain this phenomenon as a form of monopoly pricing,
where the reserve price (a take-it-or-leave-it offer) introduces a marginal revenue effect.
With asymmetric bidders, the mechanism is no longer anonymous, in the sense that strong
players are penalized according to their identity (distribution function) in order to pro-
mote competition. The FCC (for this reason or for political motivations) offered discounts
to small and minority-run businesses in their auction. Goeree and Offerman (2004) argue
that the Amsterdam auction, a Dutch format for selling real estate that involves pay-
ments to the highest losing bidder, can be viewed as an attempt to implement the optimal
mechanism under asymmetry. Lastly, Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) prove that in-
dependence is also very important to Myerson’s conclusion; any correlation between the
buyers’ information allows a monopolist to extract all expected surplus.
14We discuss this work in detail in the next section.
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1.2 Bilateral Trade
Myerson’s characterization of incentive compatibility and even more so
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem has led to an explosion in the literature
on Bayesian trading games. Perhaps the most important of these is his own
contribution with Mark Satterthwaite (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)),
which marks the first general analysis of selling procedures in which both
sides of the market hold private information. Rather than restoring faith in
the power of markets and rationality, the Myerson-Satterthwaite (M-S) the-
orem describes an impasse; any interim incentive compatible, individually
rational mechanism that balances the budget (i.e. requires no external fi-
nance) is ex post inefficient with positive probability.15 Much research since
the M-S theorem is dedicated to describing the extent of this inefficiency,
or finding relaxations of the incentive and budget constraints in order to
restore efficiency.16 For the most part however, it seems that some degree
of inefficiency is an inevitable consequence of any plausible equilibrium of a
trading game. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) for example show that there
exist interim incentive compatible, individually rational mechanisms that
satisfy budget balance and ex post efficiency if there are at least two buyers,
but the seller must commit to pay a ‘probability bribe’ even when the good
is not sold.
Given that full efficiency is impossible, M-S present conditions under
which a mechanism maximizes the ex ante gains from trade under interim
incentive compatibility, individual rationality and ex post budget balance.
Their class of ‘α mechanisms’ defines the ex ante efficient allocation rule as
a condition on the weighted virtual valuations/costs of the buyer and seller.
A solution in communication games is also included for the uniform [0, 1]
distribution, in which the incentive efficient allocation is implemented by
the k = 12 double auction.
17
15This can also be proven indirectly by showing that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mech-
anism maximizes the seller’s expected profits in interim incentive compatible individually
rational mechanisms, then checking that this mechanism runs an expected deficit, see Kr-
ishna and Perry (1998). If we can dispense with the IR constraint full efficiency can be
achieved, see D’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979), Arrow (1979).
16The literature on efficiency is vast. Our focus on optimality rather than efficiency
prohibits an extensive investigation of this work. Representative studies include Gresik and
Satterthwaite (1989), Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994) and Satterthwaite
and Williams (1989b, 2002), all of whom consider the influence of the number of traders
on the size of the inefficiency.
17This was simultaneously shown for the restricted class of k-double auctions by Chat-
terjee and Samuelson (1983) by direct computation of equilibrium allocation probabilities.
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Williams (1987) generalizes the ex ante efficiency concept in bilateral
trade by examining convex combinations of buyer and seller utilities as op-
posed to an un-weighted sum as in M-S. The solution generates a similar set
of solutions to M-S’ α mechanisms, where α is further determined by the
utility weightings.18 This model incorporates as a special case the criterion
of maximizing the seller’s (ex ante) expected profits, and confirms that the
specification of private seller information does not change the seller’s opti-
mal bilateral trading mechanism; she should make a take-it-or-leave-it-offer
(appropriately selected) to the buyer.
It appears then that a relaxation of the optimal auction program to
allow two-sided private information will not alter the structure of the so-
lution, at least for Independent Private Values.19 However, it is unknown
whether private seller information is irrelevant only in the first-best solution,
or whether this is true more generally. One cannot say whether the seller
would value holding private information if the optimal auction were con-
strained in any way, or were subject to a more general valuation structure
than IPV. Arguably, the source of this gap in understanding is the fact that
it is unclear whether the irrelevance of a buyer’s beliefs about the seller’s
information is intentional, or rather unavoidable from the seller’s perspec-
tive. A simple example presented by Yilankaya (1999), which we shall now
discuss, demonstrates the subtlety of the issue.
If the structure of the mechanism design problem were generically un-
changed by the specification of private seller information (so the correspon-
dence in designs is totally intentional), then the fact that the Myerson (1981)
mechanism is optimal for every realization conditional on the seller’s type
being public information would imply that its ex ante optimality follows
trivially. Yilankaya (1999) has shown that this is not so. When the seller’s
valuation is private information her interim expected profits in some real-
izations are higher in ex ante sub-optimal mechanisms than in the Myerson
18Building on these techniques, the existence and efficiency of the k-double auction from
the ex ante and interim perspectives has been examined by Satterthwaite and Williams
(1989a). Gresik (1991a, 1996, 1991b) address the representation of the ex ante efficient
allocation rule as a plausible communication game. The first two of his papers discuss
conditions under which one can transform an ex ante efficient allocation rule into a linear
equilibrium of the k-double auction. The latter paper shows that the restriction to ex
post individual rationality (as is common in practice; no sale means no transfer) does not
constrain the efficiency objective since any level of trade induced under interim IR can be
supported under ex post IR.
19Indeed, the first step of our analysis in Essay I (Proposition 2.2.1) is to show that this
result can be extended to the case of N > 1 buyers.
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(1981) mechanism.20 However, any attempt by the seller to change the
mechanism to her advantage would reveal her type, thus removing the an-
ticipated benefits.21 Therefore the averaging process that is undertaken in
evaluating ex ante optimality is non-trivial, as is the link between the buy-
ers’ incentive constraints and their beliefs about the mechanism the seller
would like to select. In the first paper of this thesis, we address directly
the relationship between the incentives of buyers, their beliefs/allocation
probability estimates and the design of the mechanism, and show why the
seller chooses to ‘undo’ any buyer uncertainty associated with private seller
information. The intuition is that, conditional on buyer beliefs being cor-
rect on average, greater certainty regarding the probability of allocation
increases the convexity of buyer utilities, thus reducing information rents.
We therefore provide an economic explanation for the correspondence be-
tween the optimal mechanisms of Myerson (1981) and Williams (1987). We
then apply this intuition to derive several new results and interpretations
for a well-known class of trading problems, the k-double auctions of bilat-
eral trade. To further motivate this study, the following section discusses
the relevant design literature and the limitations of its application to the
problems studied in the first essay. We then follow with a similar analysis
for the remaining essays. In the literature review for Essays II and III, we
shall start with the general results for informed principal problems, then
discuss the more auction-specific literature.
1.3 Essay I: Convex Utilities and Market Power
in Trading Mechanisms
Literature: Mechanism Design and the Seller’s Information
(Private Values)
Maskin and Tirole (1990) (M-T) show that a principal who holds private in-
formation cannot benefit above the case in which her information is known
to the agents under quasi-linear utilities. M-T use the abstraction of the
20The example he gives is that a seller with a valuation of 0 does better in the k = 12
double auction than with her optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer (k = 0) when both traders’
valuations are drawn from the uniform [0, 1] distribution.
21The theory of inscrutable design of Myerson (1983) is applicable here. If the seller
wants to change the mechanism conditional on her type, a ‘grand’ mechanism could al-
ways be conceived that is constant across her types that achieves this. The existence of
mechanisms that are interim ‘exogenously preferred’ is therefore explained by the fact that
profitable deviation to them would imply the existence of a ‘grand’ mechanism violating
the ex ante optimality of the Myerson (1981) mechanism.
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principal as a Walrasian trader who exchanges the slack on the agents’ in-
centive constraints across realizations of her type. To explain their result,
take the case in which the principal’s type is always public information,
conjecture a solution to be some profile of contracts (one for each type of
principal) and compute the principal’s expected payoff across all realiza-
tions. Now under quasi-linearity replacing the transfers from this profile
with their mean does not change the principal’s ex ante expected payoff.
Also, in this equivalent mechanism the deterministic transfer will be ‘dif-
ferenced away’ in the agents’ IC constraints, since it is the same for any
pair of types. Then in the design of any (principal-type) specific contract,
the transfer only appears directly and in the agent’s IR constraints, both
of which are independent of the principal’s type. Therefore the conditions
that describe the optimal deterministic transfer are the same for all types
of principal, as are the shadow prices on the incentive constraints. The dif-
ferent types of principal have no incentive to ‘trade’ these constraints across
realizations, in the same sense that traders with the same endowments do
not envy one another in Walrasian equilibrium.22
M-T prove that there is no benefit from allowing the agents’ incen-
tive constraints to hold on average over the principal’s information rather
than type-by-type, which appears to generalize to some extent the result of
Williams (1987), that the specification of private seller information does not
change the optimal selling mechanism. However, their argument requires
the construction of a deterministic fixed transfer mechanism, which, as an
abstraction, does not provide an economic explanation for the irrelevance
of the agents’ beliefs in equilibrium.23 Further, given any other constraints
that may apply to a trading problem, their technique can only be replicated
if such constraints perturb the entire profile of contracts in one direction.
For example, given two mechanisms that are not first-best, we can only con-
clude that one dominates the other without direct computation if transfers
in one are higher for every realization of the principal’s/seller’s type.24 The
techniques introduced in our first paper will address these issues by provid-
22See Maskin and Tirole (1990) Section 4.
23M-T also require discrete types (as opposed to a continuous type space commonly
assumed in trading games) and a sorting condition so that results relating the design
problem to the efficiency of competitive equilibrium can be applied. This limitation of the
applicability of their result to trading games is also noted by Yilankaya (1999).
24We also show that a similar problem is pervasive in auction theory with respect to
the direct derivation of the optimal selling mechanism. Using Revenue Equivalence and
Myerson’s point-wise optimization method, one can only make a general statement about
profits in two mechanisms if the allocation rule of one is ‘closer’ in every eventuality to the
first-best solution than the other. We propose new techniques that avoid this problem.
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ing an economic interpretation for the optimal belief structure of the agents
as well as novel techniques for evaluating the performance of a mechanism.
1.4 Essays II, III: Auctions with an Informed Seller
Literature: Auction/Mechanism Design and the Seller’s Informa-
tion (Common Values)
In the first essay of the thesis, we study the scenario in which each buyer
only cares about the seller’s information to the extent that it determines the
outcome of the mechanism. This is the case for which the mechanism design
results of Williams (1987) and Maskin and Tirole (1990) apply. In the sec-
ond and third essays we incorporate informational externalities, where the
principal’s private information is an explicit argument of the agents’ utility
functions. Gresik (1991c) and Maskin and Tirole (1992) have also addressed
this problem. Gresik (1991c) proves that the M-S impossibility result gener-
alizes to the case in which traders care directly about the valuation assess-
ments of others. He also addresses the ex ante efficiency problem, where the
solution is again characterized by an analogue of M-S’ α-mechanisms, with
virtual valuations adjusted for the interdependence between valuations.25
Unfortunately, the strategic constraints on ex post efficiency are even more
troublesome here than under private values, since traders have an extra in-
centive to misrepresent their information. First, fixing the beliefs of others,
misrepresentation can achieve a trade on more favorable terms, as in the IPV
model. Second and unique to the interdependent values set-up, it is also ad-
vantageous to distort other traders’ perceptions of the value of the object
through one’s actions. We depart from the analysis of Gresik by addressing
the profit objective and the implementation of auctions as communication
games under such externalities in Essays II and III.
The externalities associated with interdependent valuations dictate that
the imposition of private seller information is not only non-beneficial as in
the IPV setting, but may even constrain the first-best solution. In the IPV
case the seller can implement the optimal auction of Myerson (1981) whether
or not her information is private. For example, in an English auction bidders
have a dominant strategy to bid their value for any set of beliefs about the
seller’s information, or indeed the reserve price.26 So, while the seller does
not benefit from holding private information, she is certainly not worse off
25He does not, unlike Williams (1987), consider different weights on the utilities, so his
work does not include a solution for the optimal mechanism.
26See Riley and Samuelson (1981).
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for it. Alternatively, when the seller’s assessment of the value of the object
affects buyers’ valuations, this generates some undesirable complementari-
ties between the incentive constraints of buyers and the seller at the interim
stage of the mechanism. Maskin and Tirole (1992) in extending their 1990
paper to incorporate such ‘common value’ effects discuss the adverse selec-
tion problem in some depth, “the high (type principal) is likely to be hurt by
the (agent’s) incomplete information: either she will find herself “pooled”
with her low (type) counterpart...or else she will have to undertake costly
signaling activity...to distinguish herself.”27 For these reasons, the solution
of the optimal auction problem under informational externalities does not
follow from Myerson (1981). This distinction, of itself an interesting theoret-
ical issue, provides the structure for our analysis of a long-standing question
in auction theory, the pervasiveness of secret reserve prices.
In the second essay we examine the ex ante design problem of a seller
designing an auction when she will hold private information as to the quality
of the object. In this setting, any announced reserve price will be a signalling
mechanism in the sense of Riley (1979). As is known from Akerlof (1970), a
signalling equilibrium is inefficient since it results in a lower volume of trade
than would occur if the informed party could credibly reveal her private
information. In this essay we contrast the signalling equilibrium arising
from public announcement of a reserve price before an auction with several
secret reserve regimes. Here we consider secrecy as representing the ability to
postpone the announcement (and possibly selection) of a reserve price until
bidding has ended. In the event of non-clearance under secrecy, the reserve
is announced by way of a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the highest bidder, a
signalling outcome. If however the reserve is cleared, the object is sold at
the auction price as determined by the strategic actions of the uninformed
bidders, a screening outcome. We therefore test whether a principal can
improve upon the costly signalling mechanisms discussed by M-T above by
instead employing a mixed screening/signalling mechanism.28
27See Maskin and Tirole (1992), pp. 382.
28Different versions of the informed principal/auction design problem have been stud-
ied by Kremer and Skrzypacz (2004), Tisljar (2003), Watanabe and Yamato (2008) and
Nagareda (2003). In Kremer and Skrzypacz (2004) and Tisljar (2003) the seller has pri-
vate preference information that influences bidder valuations, and selects a game form
conditional on this information. However, in Kremer and Skrzypacz (2004) signalling oc-
curs through the auction form (eg English vs First Price), the reserve price plays no role
because the seller does not value the good at all. Similarly in Tisljar (2003) the seller’s
information, which is private, is distinct from her valuation, which is common knowledge.
Tisljar also assumes that the seller’s signal gives her the complete distribution of bidder
valuations, so she has no preference for different auction forms across states of the world,
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It turns out that a famous result from auction theory attributable to Mil-
grom and Weber (1982a) (M-W) known as the Linkage Principle applies,
but in an unexpected fashion. Their result states that the policy of announc-
ing verifiable information does not affect the seller’s expected profits under
independence, which we also assume.29 Our analysis differs from M-W since
it examines the influence of non-verifiable information and the machinery
by which information is revealed on the seller’s expected profits. We show
that the seller’s profits from immediate announcement of a reserve price
as in Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) dominate those from later announcement.
Prolonging bidders’ uncertainty exacerbates the winner’s curse, reducing re-
serve clearance rates at auction. By the Linkage Principle, there must be a
compensating increase in the share of profits from post-auction negotiation,
fixing a given reserve price strategy. Then equilibrium reserve prices will be
higher under secrecy, since the seller’s incentive to misrepresent her infor-
mation is greater, making signalling even less efficient and reducing seller
profits.
In the third essay we compare immediate announcement to the most
extreme form of a secret reserve, one that is never announced. Under the
Right of Refusal, the seller simply accepts or rejects the auction price de-
cided by the bidders. This screening mechanism can dominate the monopoly
pricing/signalling outcome of immediate disclosure, subject to some condi-
tions on the information structure. The conclusion is that if the seller’s
preferences/valuation are a sufficient statistic for the market-relevant infor-
mation,30 then screening is more efficient and generates greater seller profits
than signalling. In this essay we are therefore able to explain some well-
known phenomena in auctions through a complementary analysis of auction
there are no adverse selection effects, and she can extract all surplus. In Watanabe and
Yamato (2008) and Nagareda (2003) there are no informational externalities between buy-
ers and the seller, and hence no adverse selection. Watanabe and Yamato (2008) model
the seller’s type information as summarizing moral hazard effects; whether or not she
is a ‘cheater’. There exist separating equilibria in which the cheating seller chooses a
second-price auction and uses shill bids, while the honest seller uses a first-price auction.
Nagareda (2003) allows the seller to choose her reserve price and whether or not to disclose
it, but the lack of informational externalities means that Myerson (1981) applies, so we
already know the first-best solution.
29Alternatively, we could phrase the result as a form of Payoff Equivalence as in Theorem
3.5 from Milgrom (2004). We use the Linkage Principle terminology due to its familiarity
in the context of the seller’s information policy. The implications of the Linkage Principle
for ranking revenues across the major auction forms under interdependent values and
affiliated signals is given in Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
30As opposed to the seller interpreting given information more favourably, say due to
sentimentality (e.g. sale of a private residence).
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theory and mechanism design under private seller information and interde-
pendent valuations. The study also represents, to our knowledge, the first
analysis of the relative performances of signalling and screening equilibria in
an auction setting. This provides a framework for the principal’s selection
between the undesirable characteristics of pooling and signalling as identi-
fied by Maskin and Tirole (1992), and an explanation for the prevalence of
secret reserves as used by auction houses.
Given that the mechanisms we consider in Essays II and III are auctions,
the final body of literature we discuss here is that which is more specifically
labeled as auction theory. The strands of this research that are relevant to
our purposes address the role that asymmetric information plays in deter-
mining bidding behaviour.31 Our work differs from the majority of these
studies in that for the most part, these models have concentrated on effects
between buyers, where each holds information that the other would like to
know, or there is an ‘insider’ who has superior knowledge about the common
value of the object. This tradition starts with Wilson (1967), and the so-
called mineral-rights model. He considers a two bidder scenario in which the
insider knows the common value of the object with certainty.32 The other
player receives only a noisy signal, so in equilibrium the winner’s curse is
severe for the uninformed party. Milgrom and Weber (1982b) prove more
general results on this topic by supposing that the insider is characterized
as having the only exclusive information. The informed bidder’s profits are
increasing in the amount of information she collects, and she always does
better by acquiring this information overtly, because this makes public the
increase in the winner’s curse that is likely to be experienced if she is beaten.
The seller can benefit from announcing her own private information only if
this undoes some of the exclusivity of the insider’s information. It is pos-
sible that the seller’s information resolves the insider’s residual uncertainty
without providing the uninformed party with any useful information, which
strengthens the insider to the detriment of revenues.33
31In Chapter 3 we give a succinct treatment of the theoretical and empirical work that
relates to secret reserve prices.
32The usual analogy is that the asset is an oil or gas lease, and the insider has exclusive
access to testing of the site or owns a neighbouring site.
33The example Milgrom and Weber (1982b) give for non-beneficial announcement is as
follows. Say that the informed party has a signal X of the true value V , where X = V + !
and ! is an independent random error term. If the seller announces the value of !, the
insider completely knows her valuation, while the uninformed party learns nothing of
value. Milgrom (2004) elaborates on these ideas, describing the Linkage Principle as
generally having a publicity effect and a weighting effect that can limit or exacerbate
the bidders’ differential information. When bidders’ access to the seller’s information is
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Goeree and Boone (2008) analyze a bidding situation of a similar flavour,
but applied to privatization with the insider as an incumbent manager.34
The presence of the insider is shown to be strongly detrimental to revenues,
again due to the winner’s curse that would be suffered by beating her. To
remedy this problem, a two-stage mechanism is proposed involving initial
non-binding bids as expressions of interest. Since the lowest bidder from the
qualifying auction is excluded from competing, the first stage discriminates
against the insider by revealing her information before the ‘real’ bids are
submitted.
Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994) present a masterly fusion of the-
ory and econometrics in analyzing yet another variant of the mineral rights
model. The insider’s signal is assumed to be correlated with the unknown
reserve price of the seller. The main result is that the distributions of the
informed and uninformed bids are the same above the support of the re-
serve price, i.e. when the uninformed know their bids will be accepted and
the common value exceeds some lower bound. At lower prices where the
value of the insider’s information is uncertain, the winner’s curse takes over
and informed bids stochastically dominate the uninformed.35 The parts of
our analysis that focus on asymmetric information share some aspects of
the framework in Goeree and Boone (2008) in that we are concerned with
“situations where privatization involves substantial risk, i.e. when uncer-
tainty about the assets common value is large relative to private-value cost
differences.”36 Of course, while a reserve price can be viewed as a bid by an
insider, in our model the seller benefits from using this bid to misrepresent
her information when she loses, i.e. when she sells the good. The incumbent
manager in Goeree and Boone (2008) on the other hand is a subsidiary or di-
vision of an organization that does not benefit from being outbid (although
the ‘parent’ may). Similarly, while the effects of competition between an
informed seller and bidders are borne out in Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson
(1994), there is no insider to act as an unintentional surrogate for the seller
in our model. Also, the authors only consider the most extreme form of a
symmetric, only the publicity effect exists and public announcement is always beneficial
under affiliation.
34The authors augment Wilson’s model with private value effects so that public knowl-
edge of the common value component would not make the allocation or efficiency trivial.
35Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983) prove related results that are im-
portant to this conclusion. In a similar vein to Milgrom and Weber (1982b), the behaviour
of informed and uninformed parties is compared. The distribution of bids from the unique
insider is equal to the distribution of the maximum of the bids of the uninformed bidders.
36Goeree and Boone (2008) pp. 3.
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secret reserve (akin to our Right of Refusal) due to their interest in appli-
cations to specific markets and data requirements. As the authors note, the
presence of a secret/random reserve is exogenous and therefore unexplained
in the Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994) model; “a random reservation
price strategy is not unique to oil and gas lease auctions, but can also be
found in the private sector. Therefore, the optimality and implications of
different reserve price strategies for bidding behaviour may be of more gen-
eral interest than suggested by our work here.”37 Thus our contribution in
Essays II and III represents an expansion in both the theory of mechanism
design by an informed principal, and in that of endogenous reserve price
policies in auction theory.
37Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994) pp. 1438.
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Chapter 2
Convex Utilities and Market
Power in Trading
Mechanisms
2.1 Optimal Auctions and Private Information
One of the most significant achievements of mechanism design theory is
the result that for symmetric potential buyers any of the common auction
forms with a specifically selected reserve price maximize the seller’s expected
profits among all conceivable selling mechanisms.1 This result, attributable
to Myerson (1981) for the case in which the seller’s reservation value is
known can be simply extended to the case in which her preferences are pri-
vate information. Williams (1987) for example has demonstrated that the
Myerson mechanism for N = 1; a take it or leave it offer from seller to buyer;
maximizes the seller’s ex ante expected profits in a bilateral trade setting.
A seller therefore gains nothing from holding private preference informa-
tion if she can implement her first best design. Maskin and Tirole (1990)
present a similar result in a very general setting for discrete types; a prin-
cipal with private information should implement the complete information
optimal contract under risk neutrality.2
On the other hand, there are other communication games (that are ad-
mitted by incentive compatible, individually rational direct mechanisms) in
1It is also required that the buyers are risk neutral and draw their types independently.
2By complete information we refer to the standard case in which the agents hold private
information but the principal does not.
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which a seller clearly prefers to have private information. For example, a
seller in a bilateral trade market in which the buyer makes a take it or leave
it offer will make zero profit if her private valuation is known; in any trade
she receives the lowest possible price at which she would part with the good.
If the seller’s valuation is however unknown to the buyer, the former will
earn some informational rents. An interesting question is why the optimal
mechanism makes private information redundant for the seller, and at what
point holding this information ceases to be useful. Clearly a more detailed
explanation of how private information affects the seller’s profits across the
space of possible mechanisms is required in order to answer such questions.
A related issue of some interest to the practitioner is whether general
properties exist that describe how restrictions on communication games (for
example on the set of ‘allowable’ game forms) influence the seller’s profits in
the direct mechanisms through which market games are usually modelled.
The standard technique used to address trading models is to apply the Rev-
enue Equivalence Theorem, then check whether some given communication
game implements the optimal allocation rule. This approach is simple, but
is only instructive in comparing sub-optimal allocation rules (i.e. when con-
straints apply) when the tested allocation rules/probabilities can be ranked
point by point, since the optimal allocation rule is derived by pointwise op-
timization. Given that applied restrictions on communication games need
not map into allocation rules in such a fashion, a more flexible method of
ranking mechanisms would be of some value.
We address these issues by attacking the mechanism selection problem
from a new angle. We specifically investigate the role of the seller’s private
information by examining how she should select the allocation rule of a
mechanism as reflected by the buyers’ interim estimates of the probability
of allocation. We demonstrate that the seller’s profits are determined by two
closely linked factors; (i) The set of buyer types that are totally excluded, i.e.
have allocation probability and interim utility equal to zero;3 (ii) The slope
of the allocation probability function (or convexity of the utility function)
for higher types. Further, our characterization of the interplay between (i)
and (ii) allows us to make a general statement that links these factors to the
seller’s expected profits when a point by point ranking of allocation rules is
not achievable, for example in comparing monopoly and monopsony pricing.
By the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, a buyer’s information rents are
completely determined by her allocation probability function. This seem-
3This is the focus of Myerson’s (1981) analysis for the case in which the seller’s reser-
vation value is publicly known.
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ingly introduces a tradeoff between allocating more often to a given buyer
type, and increasing the rents that must be paid to higher types when sale
occurs in equilibrium. Under our analogue of the well known regularity
assumption and the informational requirements of Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium, we show that this tradeoff is trivial; any change in the profile of the
allocation probability function that leads to a reduction information rents
is worthwhile. One such profitable manipulation is to increase the slope
of the probability function (and thus the convexity of the utility function).
More monopolistic mechanisms induce steeper allocation probability func-
tions since buyers have less control over the price, and therefore report their
type more honestly. This means that any increase in a buyer’s type will
be translated with greater magnitude into her action/announcement in the
communication game, so the probability function is steeper in her type. Our
results therefore give a formalization of why market power (in the sense of
price setting) is advantageous for the seller even under two-sided private in-
formation; it induces steeper probability functions reducing the set of ‘lower’
types a buyer could have masqueraded as and won in equilibrium. In this
sense monopolistic mechanisms generate a greater level of virtual competi-
tion than their monopsonistic counterparts.
The generalization from the standard technique of ranking allocation
rules to ranking their expectations (the allocation probabilities) is shown
to be analogous to the relationship between first order and second order
stochastic dominance. We apply our results and the stochastic dominance
logic to explain some interesting properties of the k double auction for bi-
lateral trade. This well known 1 parameter class of allocation rules cannot
be ranked point by point, and hence, the global influence of shifts in the
parameter k on the seller’s profits is not well understood. On the other
hand, our analysis demonstrates why the seller’s expected profits are max-
imized by setting her price weighting (1− k) = 1. An interesting corollary
is that for kˆ ∈ [0, 12), the buyer’s interim probability of allocation in the
(1 − kˆ) double auction is second order stochastically dominated by that in
the kˆ mechanism. The seller therefore achieves the same ex ante volume of
trade with lower buyer estimates of the interim probability of trade in the
kˆ mechanism. This increases the level of virtual competition in the seller’s
favour.
We proceed as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model, characterizes
incentive compatibility and individual rationality, and solves the mechanism
design problem of selecting an optimal trading mechanism from the perspec-
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tive of maximizing the seller’s ex ante expected profits.4 Section 2.3 outlines
our new approach to ranking mechanisms. We then state and prove our main
result regarding probabilities, utilities and profit rankings. Section 2.4 links
our main result to the stochastic dominance criteria. The characteristics
of monopoly with reference to the slope of the probability function are dis-
cussed, and the results are interpreted with respect to the role of private
seller/principal information. Section 2.5 presents an application to the k
double auction for bilateral trade. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Preliminaries
Call the set of players I = {0, ..., N}, N ≥ 1, where Player 0 is the
seller, and I/{0} is the set of buyers. We shall use the term auction to
refer to any situation in which N ≥ 2. More generally we shall use the
term mechanism. Player j ∈ I receives a non-negative real valued signal
labelled X0, X1, X2, ..., XN respectively from the space [θj , θj ] = χj ⊂ %+.
This represents a player’s private valuation of the good. We shall suppose
that valuations/signals are statistically independent, and are distributed
according to Fj with density fj .5 All distributions are assumed to have
the familiar properties that ensure regularity, i.e. x− 1−Fj(x)fj(x) and x+
Fj(x)
fj(x)
are strictly increasing. We appeal to the Revelation Principle, momentarily
restricting our attention to direct mechanisms in which players make (not
necessarily truthful) announcements of their signals. A direct mechanism
consists of an allocation rule and payment rule.
The allocation rule Q(xˆ) = (Q1(xˆ), ..., QN (xˆ)) maps a vector of players’
announcements xˆ = (xˆ0, xˆ1, ..., xˆN ) into an allocation of the good. The good
is indivisible, so ∀i '= 0 we must have Qi = 0 or 1, and Qi = 1 for at most
one buyer.6
The payment rule M(xˆ) = (M1(xˆ), ...,MN (xˆ)) similarly maps signal
announcements of the players into individual transfers to the seller.
We define expected value functions for the allocation probability and
expected transfer of Buyer i when she announces the signal xˆi and all other
4This represents a generalization of Williams (1987) result for bilateral trade to the
case of N > 1 potential buyers. To our knowledge this result is new.
5Henceforth realisations of a variable will be written in lower case, uppercase letters
denote the random variable itself.
6From this point on we shall denote a generic buyer as i.
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players announce truthfully as follows;
qi(xˆi) =
∫
χ−i
Qi(xˆi,x−i)f(x−i)dx−i
mi(xˆi) =
∫
χ−i
Mi(xˆi,x−i)f(x−i)dx−i
where x−j = (x0, ..., xj−1, xj+1, ..., xN ), χ−j = ×h "=jχh and
f(z) = Πj:xj∈zfj(xj). All players are risk neutral, so the expected utility of
Buyer i from announcing type xˆi when her true type is xi is
Ui(xˆi, xi) = qi(xˆi)xi −mi(xˆi)
The seller differs from the buyers since she initially holds the object and,
we shall assume, receives all transfers. Our motivation for this assumption
is that with N ≥ 2 buyers, if we allow other kinds of transfers some of the
fundamental results of the mechanism design/trading literature are known to
break down. For example, Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) have shown that
there exist interim incentive compatible, individually rational mechanisms
that satisfy budget balance and ex post efficiency if there are at least two
buyers and the seller can commit to pay a ‘probability bribe’ even when the
good is not sold.7 While these results are certainly of interest, in practice
of course one does not observe transfers of this nature, so we rule them out.
The seller’s interim expected payoff is given by
U0(xˆ0, x0) = m0(xˆ0)− q0(xˆ0)x0
where
q0(xˆ0) =
N∑
i=1
∫
χ−0
Qi(xˆ0,x−0)f(x−0)dx−0
m0(xˆ0) =
N∑
i=1
∫
χ−0
Mi(xˆ0,x−0)f(x−0)dx−0
The requirements of no external finance and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) impose the equilibrium budget balance condition for xˆ = x
EX0 [m0(x0)] =
N∑
i=1
EXi [mi(xi)] (2.1)
7The result that such mechanisms are impossible for bilateral trade was given in Myer-
son and Satterthwaite (1983). On a related note, Gresik (1991a) and Gresik (1996) show
that in bilateral trade models, the imposition of ex post individual rationality on both
traders does not constrain the standard model since a mechanism satisfying this condition
can be constructed for any ex ante level of trade (efficiency) satisfying interim IR.
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The next section sets up the seller’s objective function plus the incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints for the design problem.
2.2.2 Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individual Rational-
ity (IR)
Given the arbitrary allocation and payment rules described in Section
2.2.1, we now want to restrict ourselves to equilibria of the direct mecha-
nism. That is, we would like to find rules such that it is a best response
for each player to truthfully announce their signal, given that all others are
doing likewise. This requirement is known as incentive compatibility, and is
equivalent to the condition that
Uj(xj) ≡ Uj(xj , xj) = max
xˆj∈χj
{Uj(xˆj , xj)} ∀j
Myerson (1981) demonstrates that risk neutrality combined with IC has
a powerful consequence known as the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. He
shows that U ′i(xi) = qi(xi) ≥ 0 ∀i '= 0, so we can write8
Ui(xi) = Ui(θi) +
∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti (2.2)
mi(xi) = −Ui(θi) + qi(xi)xi −
∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti (2.3)
The requirement of Individual Rationality dictates that every type of buyer
must receive an expected payoff at least as high as she would by not par-
ticipating in the mechanism. Since Ui is non-decreasing, it is sufficient that
this hold for the lowest type of buyer, so we must have Ui(θi) ≥ 0. Similarly
the seller’s IC implies
U0(x0) = U0(θ0) +
∫ θ0
x0
q0(t0)dt0 (2.4)
and her IR condition is reduced to U0(θ0) ≥ 0.9 Given the characterization
of the incentive constraints above, we now proceed to our analysis of the
mechanism design problem. An instructive first step is to examine the ex
ante design problem under two-sided private information from a conventional
approach before introducing our new method.
8See Myerson (1981), Lemma 2.
9The application of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem logic to the seller’s IC appeared
first in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) Theorem 1, Equation (4).
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2.2.3 Ex Ante Mechanism Design
Consider a seller who is ex ante designing a selling mechanism in order
to maximize her own expected profits. This seller is choosing an optimal
allocation and payment rule subject to the incentive compatibility and in-
dividual rationality of herself and the buyers at the interim stage. From the
definitions of the expected utility terms, we can write the following;10
N∑
i=1
EXi [Ui(xi)] + EX0 [U0(x0)] =
N∑
i=1
EXi [qi(xi)xi]− EX0 [q0(x0)x0]
+ EX0 [m0(x0)]−
N∑
i=1
EXi [mi(xi)]
=
N∑
i=1
EXi [qi(xi)xi]− EX0 [q0(x0)x0]
The second line disappears due to the budget balance condition that follows
from (2.1). Now substituting in the incentive compatibility conditions (2.2)
and (2.4) for each Ui and U0 we have
N∑
i=1
EXi [qi(xi)xi]− EX0 [q0(x0)x0] =
N∑
i=1
Ui(θi) + U0(θ0)
+ EX0
[ ∫ θ0
x0
q0(t0)dt0
]
+
N∑
i=1
EXi
[ ∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti
]
Call ψi(xi) the virtual valuation of Buyer i given by ψi(xi) = xi− 1−Fi(xi)fi(xi) and
ζ0(x0) the virtual cost of the seller given by ζ0(x0) = x0+
F0(x0)
f0(x0)
. Rearranging
integrals and using the definition of qj in the above expectations achieves
N∑
i=1
∫
χ
[
ψi(xi)− ζ0(x0)
]
Qi(x)f(x)dx =
N∑
i=1
Ui(θi) + U0(θ0) (2.5)
The IR conditions are represented by the requirement that both sides of the
above expression are non-negative.11 The seller’s ex ante expected profits
10In the derivations until Section 3 we shall be brief since the methods are well estab-
lished from Myerson (1981), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987).
11Given that (2.5) holds for some allocation rule we still need to verify IC by checking
that q′i ≥ 0 and q′0 ≤ 0.
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are
EX0 [U0(x0)] =
N∑
i=1
EXi [mi(xi)]− EX0 [q0(x0)x0]
Using (2.3), the definition of q0 and rearranging the integrals in a similar
fashion to (2.5), the profit equation becomes
EX0 [U0(x0)] = −
N∑
i=1
Ui(θi) +
N∑
i=1
∫
χ
[
ψi(xi)− x0
]
Qi(x)f(x)dx (2.6)
Fixing an incentive compatible allocation rule, and thus both sides of (2.5),
the seller’s profits are decreasing in
∑N
i=1 Ui(θi). Since we are still free to
divide the sum
∑N
i=1 Ui(θi) + U0(θ0) any way we see fit (subject to IC and
IR), it is optimal to set
∑N
i=1 Ui(θi) = 0. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
show for bilateral trade that the payment rule of the mechanism can always
be chosen such that Ui(θi)+U0(θ0) = U0(θ0) for a generic IC, IR allocation
rule.12 For N > 1, the result immediately follows by re-weighting their
constructed payment rule by N and ensuring that Ui(θi) = 0 ∀i.13 The
Lagrangian for this problem can now be formed using the objective (2.6),
the constraint that both sides of (2.5) are non-negative and without loss of
generality, the substitution
∑N
i=1 Ui(θi) = 0;
L =
N∑
i=1
∫
χ
[
ψi(xi)− x0
]
Qi(x)f(x)dx
+ λ
N∑
i=1
∫
χ
[
ψi(xi)− ζ0(x0)
]
Qi(x)f(x)dx (2.7)
for λ ≥ 0. We can now state the following result.14
Proposition 2.2.1. The Myerson (1981) allocation rule maximizes the ex
ante profits of a seller whose reservation value is private information if
θ0 ≥ θi, θ0 < θi ∀i '= 0.
12See their Theorem 1.
13In the Appendix we present such payment rules.
14Williams (1987) considers the question of ex ante efficiency in a bilateral trade model,
where the objective is to maximize a convex combination of buyer and seller expected
payoffs subject to IR and IC constraints. Our result extends his Theorem 2(II); maximizing
the seller’s expected payoff (in his terminology, γ = 1) to the case of N bidders.
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Proof. Any Q that maximizes (2.7) for some λ ≥ 0 and satisfies IR and IC
solves the seller’s design problem. Rewrite the Lagrangian as
L =
N∑
i=1
∫
χ
[
(1 + λ)ψi(xi)− (1 + λ)x0 − λF0(x0)
f0(x0)
]
Qi(x)f(x)dx
= (1 + λ)
N∑
i=1
∫
χ
[
ψi(xi)− x0 − αF0(x0)
f0(x0)
]
Qi(x)f(x)dx (2.8)
where we have defined α = λ1+λ ∈ [0, 1).15 Setting λ,α = 0 the objective
function collapses to that under the optimal auction programme when the
seller’s valuation is publicly known, as in Myerson (1981). We know that
since ψi is increasing (i.e. the problem is regular) this programme is solved
by using pointwise optimization to achieve the following allocation rule;
Qi(x) =
{
1 if ψi(xi) ≥ maxj "=i,0{ψj(xj), x0} i '= 0
0 otherwise (2.9)
Incentive compatibility is achieved for the buyers because the allocation
rule is tied to each buyer’s virtual valuation announcement, and we have
assumed that this function is increasing. Note that Qi(θi,x−i) = 1 only if
θi = θ0 and x0 = θ0, which is a zero probability event from the perspective
of i, so qi(θi) = 0. Given this, Ui(θi) = 0 requires mi(θi) = 0, which can
be achieved with the payment rule Mi(x) = Qi(x)xi −
∫ xi
θi
Qi(zi,x−i)dzi.
Incentive compatibility for the seller follows since we know from Myerson
(1981) that ψ−1i (xˆ0) = ψ
−1
i (x0) is optimal for each seller type. The seller’s
IR constraint U(θ0) > 0 is satisfied because θi > θ0 and the highest type of
seller trades with positive probability.16
Given this technique for solving the design problem, the profit ranking
with respect to any two IC, IR mechanisms A and B (or more generally,
within any class of mechanisms) is reduced to a comparison of their re-
spective allocation rules and inspection of Equation (2.9). This condition
is only instructive if the allocation rules of A and B can be ranked point
by point relative to the optimal allocation rule. That is, we require that
QAi (x, x0) ≥ QBi (x, x0) ∀(x, x0), i and that A always allocates less often
than the optimal mechanism (for A to dominate B) or B always allocates
15A very similar method to that implemented here is used in Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) (Theorem 2) and Gresik (1991c) (Theorem 2) to maximize total expected gains
from trade.
16This also ensures that complimentary slackness is achieved at α = 0.
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more often than the optimal mechanism (for B to dominate A). Alterna-
tively, our method can provide a profit ranking, and importantly, intuition
for this result where the above methods fail.
2.3 Ranking Mechanisms: Calculus of Variations
Method
2.3.1 The Seller’s Expected Profits
Start as before by writing the seller’s ex ante expected profits in the
expected revenue minus expected cost form
EX0 [U0(x0)] =
N∑
i=1
EXi [mi(xi)]− EX0 [q0(x0)x0] (2.10)
From the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, we have an expression for mi(xi)
that depends up to an additive constant on the allocation rule Qi(x) through
qi(xi). As in Section 2.2.3, we can without loss of generality set
∑N
i=1 Ui(θi) =
0 to achieve
EX0 [U0(x0)] =
N∑
i=1
∫ θi
θi
{
qi(xi)xi −
∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti
}
fi(xi)dxi −
∫ θ0
θ0
q0(x0)x0f0(x0)dx0
=
∫
χ
[ N∑
i=1
{
qi(xi)xi −
∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti
}
− q0(x0)x0
]
f(x)dx (2.11)
The second line follows because we can take expectations for each mi over
all other xj ’s since qi depends only on xi, then factor out the joint pdf
f(x) due to independence. In Section 2.2.3 we evaluated these terms using
the definitions of the qj ’s and rearranged the integrals to yield an expres-
sion identical to that in Myerson (1981). This expression was maximized
pointwise with respect to Q. Here we instead phrase the profit maximiza-
tion problem in terms of selecting the functions that determine each buyer’s
(and the seller’s) interim estimate of the probability she receives or parts
with the object, q = (q0, ..., qN ). Note that we are only free to choose these
functions such that the probability estimates are correct on average as must
be the case in equilibrium. These restrictions are defined as follows, where
Si is Buyer i’s ex ante share of total trade;
Ji(q) ≡
∫ θi
θi
qi(xi)fi(xi)dxi − Si
∫ θ0
θ0
q0(x0)f0(x0)dx0 = 0 ∀i '= 0 (2.12)
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We can now outline our method for ranking the profitability of different
mechanisms for the seller given the selection of q. The following section
presents a brief review of the mechanics of the Calculus of Variations before
applying these techniques to the design problem.
2.3.2 Calculus of Variations
The simplest problem in the multidimensional calculus of variations in-
volves choosing a vector valued function y of a and its gradient ∇y, where
a = (a1, ..., al), y = (y1(a1), ..., yl(al)). These functions are chosen in order
to find an extremal for an integral over a subspace of the domain of a.17
Take an integral of the form
pi =
∫
Ω
Φ(y,∇y;a)da (2.13)
where Φ is a scalar function, Ω is a bounded domain, and the boundary dΩ
is regular. The seller’s profit maximization problem has a similar form, since
she is choosing l = N +1 functions (the qj ’s), each of a single variable (xj),
and we can define Ω = χ which, as a finite Cartesian product of compact
subsets of %+ is closed and has a regular boundary. A necessary condition
for the chosen functions y and ∇y to achieve an extreme value for pi is that
no nearby trajectories do better. An alternative trajectory is represented by
a perturbation δy, and we are interested in the change in pi conditional on
this perturbation, or δpi = pi(y + δy)− pi(y). For infinitesimal δy and δ∇y,
we can linearize Φ(y + δy) to write
Φ(y + δy,∇(y + δy);a) = Φ(y,∇y;a) + Φyδy + Φ∇yδ∇y
+ o(|δy|, |∇δy|)
Here Φy,Φ∇y denote the partials of the integrand Φ with respect to the
vectors y,∇y respectively ignoring their dependence on a. So we have
δpi =
∫
Ω
[
Φyδy + Φ∇yδ∇y
]
da+ o(|δy|, |∇δy|) (2.14)
17All techniques in this subsection are standard in the calculus of variations and can be
found in for example Kamien and Schwartz (1981). A similar principle to that applied
here has also been used for a one dimensional problem in the context of auction theory
by Hafilir and Krishna (2008). They prove that with asymmetric bidders and resale, the
expected revenue from a First Price auction is exceeds that from a Second Price auction.
This difference is also shown to be increasing in the degree of bidder asymmetry.
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The linearity of the operators δ and ∇ means that their order can be in-
terchanged. Making this substitution and using the multivariable version of
integration by parts the second term in the integral from (2.14) above can
be written as∫
Ω
Φ∇yδ∇yda = −
∫
Ω
δy∇Φ∇yda+
∫
dΩ
δyΦ∇ydθ (2.15)
where θ is the vector of coordinates on the boundary dΩ. Therefore
δpi =
∫
Ω
(Φy −∇Φ∇y)δyda+
∫
dΩ
Φ∇yδydθda
+ o(|δy|, |∇δy|) (2.16)
For infinitesimal δy, o(|δy|, |∇δy|) disappears, and the effect of the variation
on pi is given by two terms; the first describes the change in the objective
fixing the values of y at the boundary coordinates, the remainder is the effect
of changing the boundary values of y themselves. Initially, we shall consider
perturbations of y such that the boundary coordinates and the value of the
alternative function y+ δy at these coordinates are fixed.18 In this case, we
say the boundary conditions are posed, which means that δy = 0 on dΩ and∫
dΩΦ∇yδydθda = 0. Then for y to achieve an extreme value for pi, y and∇y must satisfy
δpi =
∫
Ω
{
Φy −∇Φ∇y
}
δyda = 0 (2.17)
The Fundamental Lemma of the Calculus of Variations states that since the
choice of δy is arbitrary, the only way for this condition to be generically
satisfied is for y and ∇y to be such that
Φy −∇Φ∇y = 0 ∀a (2.18)
This system describes l conditions referred to as the Euler-Lagrange equa-
tions, which are solved for each y along with the boundary conditions. The
final issue we must address before subjecting the profit maximization prob-
lem to this method is the incorporation of constraints. Recall that we are
not free to choose the allocation probability functions in q as we please; this
selection is subject to the equilibrium requirements of incentive compatibil-
ity, individual rationality and the implementation of Bayes’ Rule in PBE,
18Shortly we fully specify the objective function, and verify that boundary constraints
are trivially satified for the selection of q0. In Section 2.4.4 we consider variations in the
other selected functions at the boundaries.
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as summarized by Ji(q) = 0 ∀i '= 0 in (2.12). Thankfully, this concern is
easily dealt with, since when the selected functions are subject to integral
constraints in the calculus of variations, the variation is simply applied to
the augmented objective function given the familiar Lagrangian multiplier
method, in our case;19
pi =
∫
χ
[ N∑
i=1
{
qi(xi)xi −
∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti
}
− q0(x0)x0
]
f(x)dx+
N∑
i=1
λiJi(q)
=
∫
χ
[ N∑
i=1
{
qi(xi)(xi + λi)−
∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti
}
− q0(x0)(x0 +
N∑
i=1
λiSi)
]
f(x)dx
(2.19)
The multiplier λi applies to the constraint that relates Buyer i’s ex ante
share of trade to the total volume of trade, as in (2.12). It should now be
evident from examination of (2.19) that we do not need to consider any
boundary conditions for the selection of q0. The variation in the boundary
term
∫
dΩΦ∇yδydθda is equivalent to the partial of Φ with respect to the
derivative of the function under consideration, evaluated at the boundary
values of a. For the selection of q0, Φ is independent of q′0, so the condition
[Φq′0 ]
θ0
θ0
= 0 is always satisfied. With the objective specified, we now prove a
general result that will allow us to rank expected profits to the seller across
mechanisms.
2.3.3 The Main Result
To apply the calculus of variations method, we first set Ω = χ and a = x.
We are primarily interested in the role of private seller information, and
thus the aspect of the allocation rule that describes trade between the seller
and each buyer. We shall therefore assume symmetry in the distribution
functions of i '= 0, so that fi = f and Fi = F .20
Lemma 2.3.1. Under symmetry, for any vector of functions q−0 setting
λi = −x0 for i '= 0 is optimal.
Proof. The weighting fi = f is the same on every term in {.} from Equation
(2.19), and since these have a symmetric form, it is optimal to set Si =
19Again we use independence to factor out the joint pdf.
20We envisage our result being applied to problems in which constraints on the allocation
rule are imposed symmetrically across i #= 0 for N > 1 so that the above restriction is
harmless.
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N , λi = λ ∀i '= 0. Each buyer receives the same ex ante share of trade
and has her expected payments weighted equally in the objective. Then∑N
i=1 λiSi = λ, and from (2.19) the Euler-Lagrange equation for the function
q0 is
Φq0 −
d
dx0
Φq′0 = −(x0 +
N∑
i=1
λiSi)f(x) = 0
λ = −x0 (2.20)
By inspection of (2.19), concavity of the objective is satisfied because Φq0 is
positive for λ < −x0 and negative for λ > −x0.
Φ is independent of q′0, so the second term in the Euler-Lagrange equa-
tion disappears. This identifies λ, which describes the optimal weighting
of q0 relative to each qi in the objective function, subject to satisfaction
of the constraints. Having established a link between q0 and each qi un-
der the constraint, we can now move on to the more instructive part of
our analysis, identifying a method for ranking profits across mechanisms in
terms of the qi’s. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem dictates that the inte-
grand of expected revenue is a linear function of the information rent term∫ xi
θi
qi(ti)dti = Ui and its derivative qi(xi). Given our symmetry assumption,
for i '= 0 let qi = q, Ui = U . Then we can define for i '= 0 the represen-
tative functions y = U =
∫ x
θ q(t)dt, y
′ = U ′ = q(x) to be inserted into the
N remaining Euler-Lagrange conditions. These facts, combined with our
previous work give us the following result.
Proposition 2.3.1. Fix U(θ) = U , U(θ) = 0, and say that −f(x) −
d
dx [f(x)(x − x0)] < 0 for x ∈ [a, b] ⊆ [θ, θ]. Then any perturbation of the
interim expected utility U(x) =
∫ x
θ q(t)dt toward 0 for x ∈ [a, b] such that
δU = 0 at all other values increases the seller’s expected profits.
Proof. Given that U(θ) = 0 and U(θ) = U the values of U are fixed at
the boundaries, so for each i '= 0 δpi = ∫ θθ {ΦU − ddxΦU ′}δUdx ∀x. Now
compute the N identical expressions from the left hand side of (2.18) using
(2.19) so that for we have ΦU = −f(x), ddxΦU ′ = ddx [(x+ λ)f(x)]. With the
substitution λ = −x0, this yields
−f(x)− d
dx
[(x− x0)f(x)] < 0 x ∈ [a, b] (2.21)
Under this condition any reduction in
∫ x
θ q(t)dt, i.e. δU < 0 for x ∈ [a, b]
fixing δU = 0 elsewhere sets δpi > 0, and so must increase the seller’s
expected profits.
29
The constraint condition λ = −x0 reflects the fact that the cost of in-
creasing the probability of allocation in any solution, i.e. fixing every qi for
i '= 0 is x0; the seller would forego her cost/valuation by allocating the good.
Given this constraint, the calculus of variations problem describes the trade-
off between reducing a buyer’s information rent U =
∫ a
θ q(t)dt at say x = a,
given that this must reduce the seller’s efficient payoff q(x)(x − x0) from
buyer types below a. The condition (2.21) in Proposition 2.3.1 ensures that
this tradeoff is worthwhile; the probability of allocating to any type given
the possible surplus (x−x0) should be sacrificed in order to reduce the infor-
mation rents on those types above. Although Proposition 2.3.1 states that
any reduction in U over some domain is beneficial, we shall be primarily
interested in situations in which U is reduced ∀x ∈ (θ, θ). Therefore, for the
remainder of the analysis we shall assume that (2.21) holds ∀x.
A natural question is how reductions in interim utility can be achieved.
Clearly if the problem is not constrained in any way the solution is trivial;
one should set q(x) = 0 and thus U(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ (θ, θ). There are three
reasons why this cannot occur in equilibrium. First, if we fix some allocation
rule such that the object is allocated with positive probability, then the
constraint Ji(q) = 0 ∀i '= 0 ensures that q will be positive over some
domain. The seller cannot deceive buyers into believing they cannot win
when this is a possibility. Second, the seller’s interim IC will indeed ensure
that the good will be allocated with positive probability, since she will seek
positive profits through trade. Third, we must ensure that U(θ) is fixed at
U so reductions in U for types below θ cannot be so dramatic as to prevent
this. Rather, we shall be looking at more subtle reductions in U(x) that
relate to the shape of expected utility, and the economics of how market
power and the pricing rule determines this shape, which is the subject of
Section 2.4.2. Before presenting this analysis, we first discuss the intuition
and implications of Proposition 2.3.1 in further detail.
2.4 Probabilities and Convexity
2.4.1 Ranking Mechanisms Using Stochastic Dominance
How would one compare the condition in (2.21) to the requirement of
increasing virtual valuations (regularity) as used in the standard proof of
Proposition 2.2.1? Regularity can be written as
2f(x) + f ′(x)
1− F (x)
f(x)
> 0 (2.22)
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Equation (2.21) is equivalent to
2f(x) + f ′(x)(x− x0) > 0 (2.23)
If f ′(x) ≥ 0 at every point, then both conditions are satisfied. If f ′(x) <
0 ∀x, it is easily verified that regularity is stronger, i.e. (2.22) implies
(2.23) when ψ(x) ≥ x0, and weaker when ψ(x) ≤ x0. Then in some sense
our condition (2.23) is an ‘average’ around the pivot point ψ−1(x0) from
the pointwise optimization. This is intuitive given that we are concerned
with the selection of q, itself an average over the subject of the pointwise
optimization, Q. Our quest for a method that is more flexible than pointwise
ranking has therefore been accommodated by a smoothed version of the
regularity condition. The interpretation of Proposition 2.3.1 as an average
and a generalization of the pointwise method is further strengthened when
we consider the characteristics of the probability function.
The probability function q is the expectation over the types of all other
players such that a buyer wins the object in equilibrium. Maintaining our
assumption of symmetry in distributions and the allocation rule for i '=
0, and considering only the probability of transfer between the seller and
some Buyer i, we can characterize q as a mechanism dependent probability
function. Let us present this now formally.
Observation 2.4.1. In any incentive compatible direct mechanism A that
is symmetric among i '= 0, we can write qA as a joint probability function
characterized by the threshold type xA(x0);
xA(x0) =
{
inf{x : QAi (Xi = x,X0 = x0, Xj < x,∀j '= i, 0) = 1} if this exists,
θ + c, c > 0 otherwise
The probability function qA(t) can be written as Pr[xA(X0) ≤ t]F (t)N−1,
where xA(X0) is a mechanism dependent random variable. Two mechanisms
can then be compared in terms of the distributions of the threshold values
they induce.
The threshold value xA(x0) is the lowest type of Buyer i that can win
the object given seller type x0, assuming that i is the highest buyer type.21
When winning the good is impossible in equilibrium conditional on x0, we
set xA(x0) > θ so that the buyer assigns zero probability of winning to all
such values of x0.22 The random variables (X−(i,0), xA(X0)) have their own
21Of course, xA(x0) is independent of the identity of the buyer.
22The larger the set of seller types for whom xA(x0) > θ the lower q
A(t) for every t.
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joint cdf FA which inherits the usual properties of being non-decreasing on
[θ, θ]N−1 × [xA(θ0), xA(θ0)] and taking the values of 0 and 1 at the bound-
aries. However, we are interested in the function qA(t) = Pr[xA(X0) ≤
t]F (t)N−1 which applies FA to the argument t ∈ [θ, θ]. Since [xA(θ0), xA(θ0)]
and [θ, θ] need not perfectly overlap, in general Pr[xA(X0) ≤ θ] ≤ 1, and
there is no guarantee that in comparing two mechanisms, Pr[xA(X0) ≤ θ] =
Pr[xB(X0) ≤ θ] = 1. Recognizing that qA is characterized by FA over the
restricted domain [θ, θ], we can recast the result of Proposition 2.3.1 in terms
of stochastic dominance criteria.
A distribution H dominates another distribution G over the domain
[θ, θ] according to Restricted First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) if
and only if H(t) ≤ G(t) ∀t ∈ [θ, θ] with at least one strict inequality.
H dominates G in terms of Restricted Second Order Stochastic Dominance
(SOSD) if and only if
∫ x
θ H(t)dt ≤
∫ x
θ G(t)dt ∀x, and with at least one
strict inequality.
Proposition 2.4.1. Say that UA(θ) = UB(θ) = 0, UA(θ) = UB(θ) = U
and ( 2.21) holds ∀x. Then Mechanism A generates greater seller profits
than Mechanism B if FA dominates FB in terms of SOSD.
Proof. The proof follows by substituting qA(t) = Pr[xA(X0) ≤ t]F (t)N−1
and qB(t) = Pr[xB(X0) ≤ t]F (t)N−1 as per Observation 2.4.1 into the defi-
nition of SOSD then applying Proposition 2.3.1, which is allowable because
the boundary conditions and (2.21) are satisfied. We call this case the weak
form of SOSD because the condition holds with equality at x = θ.23
The stochastic dominance perspective is useful in several senses. First,
it shows that our calculus of variations method of proof does indeed gen-
eralize the standard point by point method since, given Observation 2.4.1,
the latter is equivalent to establishing First Order Stochastic Dominance,
i.e. pointwise ranking of distributions/probabilities, which implies but is
stronger than SOSD.24
23Note that the following is true for any distribution over any subset [θ, θ] of its domain;R θ
θ
F (t)dt = θF (θ) − θF (θ) − R θ
θ
tf(t)dt. In the standard unrestricted implementation
of stochastic dominance, two distributions are compared over their supports, which are
assumed identical. Then FA(θ) = 1, FA(θ) = 0 and similarly for B, so the weak case
of SOSD will imply that the distributions have the same mean. Under our restricted
definition of SOSD this not guaranteed, since FB(θ) need not equal FA(θ). It follows that
our definition of SOSD is not in general equivalent to the concept of a mean preserving
spread.
24While FOSD implies SOSD, Proposition 2.3.1 does not as yet imply that FOSD of
32
Further, this generalization provides us with an obvious approach for
achieving new profit ranking results; search for conditions where SOSD holds
and FOSD does not. As we shall see, this leads us to examine some inter-
esting classes of mechanisms, in particular explaining why the seller prefers
more monopolistic to monopsonistic pricing. SOSD intuitively relates to the
variance of a distribution, and it is simple to see that the probability function
q(x), when positive, is spread over more values of x under monopsony than
monopoly. The reason is that monopsonistic mechanisms smooth a buyer’s
uncertainty regarding whether or not she will win the object over more real-
izations of her type, since no particular type would choose to lock-in a zero
probability of trade. On the other hand, monopolistic mechanisms totally
exclude some low buyer types, thus pushing the mass of the q’s toward the
set of high types. The relationship between monopoly pricing, the shape of
the utility and probability functions and the seller’s expected profits is now
discussed.
2.4.2 Probabilities/Convexity and Monopoly Pricing
We are interested in making some statements about expected profits in
mechanisms in which the allocation probabilities cannot be ranked point by
point. That is, we are searching for conditions where SOSD will succeed
where FOSD fails. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the criterion
that links SOSD to the allocation rule in such cases is convexity in utili-
ties, or equivalently, the slope of the allocation probability function. The
proposition that follows is an exposition of this fact. The remainder of the
section is dedicated to an examination of how more monopolistic pricing can
be used to facilitate convexity.
Proposition 2.4.2. Say that UA(θ) = UB(θ) = U , UA(θ) = UB(θ) = 0
and qA and qB intersect at x = x′, where UA(x′), UB(x′) > 0.25 Then
if U ′′A(x) > U ′′B(x) wherever both are positive, Mechanism A generates
greater ex ante expected profits to the seller than Mechanism B.
Proof. The convexity condition; U ′′A(x) > U ′′B(x) wherever both are posi-
tive is equivalent to the statement q′A(x) > q′B(x) wherever positive. Since
itself can be used to achieve a profit ranking. The reason is that FOSD implies the strong
form of SOSD, i.e. that the boundary conditions are violated. In Section 2.4.4 we provide
conditions such that the strong form of SOSD is sufficient for a profit ranking through a
treatment of the effect of variations at the boundaries.
25The alternative is that qA and qB don’t intersect (or equivalently, they do but trivially
at q(x′) = 0), in which case the allocation rules can be ranked point by point.
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qA and qB cross where both are positive at x′, we have qA(x) < qB(x)
for x < x′, qA(x) > qB(x) for x > x′ and xA(θ0) > xB(θ0). These facts
imply that UA(x) < UB(x) for x ≤ x′. For x ≥ x′, take the points
UA(x′) < UB(x′) and UA(θ) = UB(θ). Then UA(x) and UB(x) cannot
intersect between x′ and θ, since this would imply that UB is steeper than
UA over some subset of [x′, θ], which we have shown is impossible. Then
UA(x) ≤ UB(x) ∀x, with strict inequality for x < θ, so by Proposition
2.3.1 Mechanism A dominates Mechanism B.
Convexity of the utility function describes the slope of the allocation
probability function qi from the perspective of a generic buyer. Observa-
tion 2.4.1 shows that, fixing symmetry among i '= 0, in any two Mecha-
nisms A and B we have qA(x) = Pr[xA(X0) ≤ x]F (x)N−1 and qB(x) =
Pr[xB(X0) ≤ x]F (x)N−1. The purpose of this observation was purely ex-
pository; to identify q as a probability function over a mechanism dependent
random variable so that stochastic dominance intuition could be invoked.
An equivalent but more natural way to express q in the context of equilib-
rium in the mechanism would be for it to reflect a buyer’s direct expectation
over the unknown types of the other players, applied to the threshold values
required for Buyer i to win in equilibrium. In this vein, we can alternatively
write qA(x) = F0(xA0 (x))F (x)N−1 where
xA0 (x) =
{
sup{x0 : QAi (Xi = x,X0 = x0, Xj < x,∀j '= i, 0) = 1} if this exists,
θ0 otherwise
and similarly for B.26 The threshold value x0 defines the highest type of
seller that allows Buyer i to win the object in equilibrium, conditional on
her being the highest type among j '= 0. If winning is impossible conditional
on the type realization x, then x0(x) = θ0 and the cdf over X0 ensures that
the buyer’s interim probability estimate is q(x) = 0. Recalling Proposition
2.4.2, we are interested in differences in the convexity of utilities in A and
B, where positive, as described by differences in the slopes of qA and qB,
again where positive. Under the conditions of Proposition 2.4.2, the seller
should then choose the mechanism with the higher q′(x).
Observation 2.4.2. The seller’s threshold type function x0(x) is steeper in
her preferred mechanism at x = x′.
Proof. To see this, use q(x) = F0(x0(x))F (x)N−1 and we have
q′(x) = f0(x0(x))
dx0(x)
dx
F (x)N−1 + F0(x0(x))
d
dx
F (x)N−1 (2.24)
26Again, xA0 (x) depends only on the buyer’s type realization x, not on her identity.
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Given that qA and qB intersect at x = x′, the convexity condition becomes
q′A(x) > q′B(x) if and only if dx
A
0 (x)
dx >
dxB0 (x)
dx at x = x
′.
Of course, the threshold type cannot be separately chosen at each point,
it is an increasing and continuous function reflecting the allocation rule of
some equilibrium. Arbitrarily choosing xA0 (x) to be steeper over some do-
main may alter the probability functions qA and qB such that they no longer
intersect, rendering Proposition 2.4.2 inapplicable. In fact, we demonstrate
that for a broad class of allocation rules the seller can indeed chose a steeper
function for x0(x) while ensuring that intersection in probability functions
occurs. Moreover, for a general class of mechanisms this can be achieved by
a convergence toward monopoly pricing. We argue that the use of monopoly
pricing to achieve steeper threshold type functions, or equivalently greater
convexity in utilities, provides intuition for the result that the specification
of private seller information does not change the optimal selling mechanism.
2.4.3 Ex Ante Efficiency and the Convexity Condition
Williams (1987) defines for bilateral trade (i = {1}) a group of allocation
rules parameterized by t, s ∈ [0, 1] as follows
Q(t,s)1 (x, x0) =
{
1 if ψs(x) ≡ x− s1−F (x)f(x) ≥ x0 + tF0(x0)f0(x0) ≡ ζt(x0)
0 otherwise
(2.25)
Specific cases of the (t, s) allocation rule are shown by Williams (1987) to
maximize the ex ante total expected gains from trade (efficiency), where t
and s are dictated by the weights on the buyer’s and seller’s utilities respec-
tively.27 The following proposition examines the relationship between the
slope of x0(x) and its level.
Proposition 2.4.3. Among the set of ex ante efficient allocation rules,
there is no tradeoff between the level and slope of the allocation probability
function.
Proof. First define x(t,s)0 (x) = ζ
−1
t (ψs(x)), which is decreasing in t and s for
x ≥ x(t,s)(θ0). On the other hand, it is easily verified using the regularity
conditions that dx
(t,s)
0 (x)
dx is decreasing in t and increasing in s, again for
27Under our symmetry assumption the analogue for N > 1 is identical once we index
Player 1 as the highest type of buyer. It is easily verified that (t, s) = (0, 1) describes the
allocation rule that maximizes the seller’s profits from Proposition 2.2.1.
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x ≥ x(t,s)(θ0). Then by a continuity argument, the seller can always decrease
t and increase s to increase the slope of x0(x) at a given intersection point
x′ without affecting x(t,s)0 (x′). The key to this is that from (2.25) x(t,s)(θ0)
is independent of t. The seller can make her threshold type function steeper
while achieving a given level for x0(x′) by making x0(x) ‘start’ later, i.e. by
increasing x(t,s)(θ0).
The seller’s threshold type function is so steep under monopoly because
as a price-taker, the buyer truthfully announces her valuation, so any in-
crease in her type will be mapped directly into an increase in her allocation
probability. Having made this observation, a simple computation shows
that s = 1 maximizes the slope of x(t,s)0 for any t, minimizing the slope of
x(t,s)(x0) and thus the set of seller types who never trade.
Maskin and Tirole (1990) have shown that a principal does not benefit
from holding private information under risk neutrality. That is, she chooses
the same profile of contracts conditional on her type and reaps the same
ex ante profits. Our exposition of the link between monopoly price setting
and the seller’s preference for convex utilities/steep allocation probabilities
provides a new interpretation for this fact.28 The lowest type of seller ignores
the effects of holding private information because buyers do; they always
view themselves as competing against her, since they must announce a type
above x(θ0) to have any chance of winning. Conditional on this, to allow the
allocation rule to reflect in any way the buyer’s beliefs (in the above class t '=
0) would force some types of seller to lock in a zero probability of trade, since
the allocation probability must be decreasing in x0 and the set of ex ante
excluded types is so high. Given that monopoly pricing is an equilibrium
regardless of whether the seller’s type is private information, the seller has
benefited from undoing the effects of holding private information because
monopoly maximizes the slope of the threshold type function x0, and thus
convexity. Under the conditions of Proposition 2.4.2, greater convexity leads
to greater seller profits.
Our calculus of variations method ranks mechanisms through a condi-
tion on the buyers’ interim utilities, so it is of interest to know how their
average utilities, or ex ante expected surplus is affected. Reducing U(x)
for (almost) every x must also reduce its expectation, so ranking mecha-
nisms through SOSD achieves a lower expected surplus for the buyers. The
28In fact, while the intuition is similar to that in Maskin and Tirole (1990), Bayesian
trading games are not a special case of their analysis since they assume discrete types.
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following identity can be used to demonstrate this intuition;
U(θ) ≡ U(θ)F (θ)− U(θ)F (θ)∫ θ
θ
q(x)dx =
∫ θ
θ
U(x)f(x)dx+
∫ θ
θ
U ′(x)F (x)dx∫ θ
θ
q(x)[1− F (x)]dx = EX [U(x)] (2.26)
Increasing the convexity of utilities means that although the q’s will be
higher ‘at the top’,29 they are weighted by [1 − F (x)], which is lower as
we approach θ. The content of Proposition 2.4.2 is that regardless of the
differences in q(θ) across mechanisms, stacking the probability function to
be higher ‘at the top’ reduces the left hand side of the above expression and
thus the buyer’s expected surplus. While it may be intuitive that the seller
wishes to capture the buyers’ surplus, the real value of Proposition 2.4.2
is that we have argued that such a redistribution is always advantageous
(given the distribution assumption of Proposition 2.3.1), regardless of any
effects on the level of total surplus. That is, we are not relying on a division
of surplus argument. The intuition of our results can be further extended so
that they do not require fixing the boundary values of U . The next section
develops this result. In Section 2.5 we apply our results to a well-known
class of mechanisms, the k double auctions of bilateral trade.
2.4.4 Free Boundary Conditions and U(θ)
We assumed in Section 2.3.2 that the variation, that is, the types of func-
tions for U we were comparing differed in the interior of their domains, but
not on the boundaries. In this section we relax the fixed boundary assump-
tion at x = θ and provide conditions such that the intuition of Proposition
2.3.1 carries through. We ignore the boundary condition for x = θ since we
are only concerned with mechanisms in which Ui(θ) = 0 ∀i '= 0 as per the
arguments of Section 2.2.3.
Corollary 2.4.1. (Proposition 2.3.1) Taking the variation including the
boundary term from Eq. (2.16), in order for reductions in U to remain
29Recall we are presuming that the q’s intersect.
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advantageous the N variations on Ui for i '= 0 must satisfy ∀δU < 0∫ θ
θ
[ΦU − d
dx
ΦU ′ ]δUdx+ ΦU ′ |x=θδU(θ) > 0
−
∫ θ
θ
[f(x) +
d
dx
[f(x)(x− x0)]]δUdx+ f(θ)[θ − x0]δU(θ) > 0(2.27)
If we maintain (2.21) ∀x the first term is positive for δU < 0. However,
the addition of the variation on the boundary term introduces a countervail-
ing force; if U is reduced for every x then δU(θ) < 0 and the second term in
(2.27) will be negative for some values of x0.30 The net effect of the variation
on the seller’s profits will be dictated by the relative magnitudes of δU and
δU(θ). A specific example of this condition is computed and verified in the
application we consider in the next section. When (2.27) holds ∀δU < 0, we
have the following;
Observation 2.4.3. If the allocation rules of Mechanisms A and B can
be ranked point by point, so can their respective probability functions qA
and qB. Then if (without loss of generality) qA(x) ≤ qB(x) ∀x with strict
inequality for some subset of [θ, θ], FA dominates FB in terms of FOSD,
and therefore also in terms of SOSD. From Corollary 2.4.1, Mechanism A
dominates Mechanism B if (2.27) holds.31
Again, it is only appropriate to state this observation after proving Corol-
lary 2.4.1, because FOSD implies the strict form of SOSD;
∫ θ
θ F
A(t)dt <∫ θ
θ F
B(t)dt. This means that UA(θ) < UB(θ) so the boundary conditions
are not fixed and Proposition 2.3.1 cannot be applied.
2.5 Applications: k-Double Auctions in Bilateral
Trade
We now apply our results to analyze some known, but curious results
from a particularly interesting case of bilateral trade, the linear equilibria of
30The only exception is where x0 is always greater than θ, in which case gains from
trade do not exist.
31Of course, (2.27) can hold even when FOSD does not. For example, take the conditions
of Proposition 2.4.1, in which qA and qB cross, but say that UA(x) < UB(x) ∀x so that
UA(θ) #= UB(θ). This is equivalent to the strict form of SOSD. We consider such a case
in the next section.
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the sealed bid k double auction as modelled by Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1983). In this format, a buyer and seller submit sealed tenders B and S
respectively, with trade occurring when B ≥ S, at a price determined by
the parameter k ∈ [0, 1] according to P = kB + (1 − k)S. Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) characterize equilibrium strategies, allocation rules and
probabilities and expected (ex ante) profits for each party. For buyer and
seller valuations distributed uniformly on [0, 1], they derive the result that
the seller’s expected profits are maximized at k = 0.32 Therefore the seller
wishes to maximize her market (price setting) power, as captured by the
price weighting (1 − k). On the other hand, the ex ante volume of trade
varies non-monotonically over k according to v(k) = 18(−k2+k+2). It is not
well understood whether the seller’s preference for the lowest possible k is
purely an artefact of the simple linear structure of the example, or whether
it reflects some deeper economic reasoning. Arguably the source of this gap
in understanding is the fact that mechanisms in this class are completely
described by the parameter k, and the sign of the relationship between k and
the equilibrium allocation rule (over and above its ex ante expectation v(k))
varies over the domain of signals. In other words, the allocation probabilities
of mechanisms in this class cannot be ranked point by point. To see this,
examine the bid and offer functions below;
S(x0) =
x0
2− k +
1− k
2
B(x) =
x
1 + k
+
k(1− k)
2(1 + k)
Given the bid and offer functions in the k double auctions, a buyer of type
x wins the object in equilibrium iff x0 ≤ xk0(x);
xk0(x) =
{
2−k
1+k
[
x− 1−k2
]
if x ≥ 1−k2
0 otherwise
(2.28)
From these definitions we have the following result.
Proposition 2.5.1. No two mechanisms in the class of k double auctions
can be ranked point by point, or, equivalently, by FOSD.
Proof. To demonstrate that the point by point method is inapplicable in this
scenario, note that given some k, the buyer’s allocation probability estimate
for types at or above 1−k2 is q
k(x) = F0(xk0(x)) = xk0(x) under the uniform
32See Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) Example 1 pp. 842.
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[0, 1] distribution. The value x(0) = 1−k2 is decreasing in k, so for k
′ > k
there exist buyer types such that qk(x) < qk′(x). Alternatively, qk(1) = 2−k2
which is decreasing in k, so qk(1) > qk′(1). It follows that no two allocation
rules in the class of k double auctions can be ranked point by point.
On the other hand, our technique can be applied. The following proposi-
tion compares allocation rules in pairs of mechanisms subject to fixed bound-
ary conditions, i.e. where Uk(0) = Uk′(0) = 0 and Uk(1) = Uk′(1).
Proposition 2.5.2. For kˆ ∈ [0, 12), the buyer’s interim probability of allo-
cation in the kˆ double auction dominates that in the (1− kˆ) double auction
by weak SOSD. By Propositions 2.3.1, 2.4.1 the kˆ double auction generates
greater profits to the seller than the (1− kˆ) double auction.
Proof. Our previous discussion has already shown that the allocation prob-
abilities of kˆ and 1− kˆ intersect. Now compute q′k(x) when x ≥ 1−k2 to give
2−k
1+k . Since this is decreasing in k, so is the convexity of utility. To check
the remaining conditions for Propositions 2.3.1 and 2.4.1 note that the con-
dition in (2.21) is satisfied because under any uniform distribution f(x) we
have f ′(x) = 0, so the condition collapses to −2 < 0 ∀x. By inspection of
(2.28), q(0) = 0 and thus U(0) = 0 for any k. We can now compare any
two mechanisms in the class of k double auctions according to our convexity
criteria provided they have the same U(1). Under the uniform [0, 1] distri-
bution we can say that Uk(1) =
∫ 1
0 q
k(t)dt =
∫ 1
0 q
k(t)f(t)dt = v(k). So any
two mechanisms with the same volume of trade have the same U(1). Chat-
terjee and Samuelson (1983) show that in the k double auction the volume
of trade v(k) is symmetric in k around k = 12 , which proves the result.
33
Having fixed U(1) and decreased U(x) at every other x, we must have
reduced the buyer’s expected surplus. A useful property of the k double
auction under uniform beliefs is that both the volume of trade and the total
surplus are pinned down once we have U(1).34 The seller therefore achieves a
better division of the fixed surplus. The more convex and more monopolistic
33Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) provide more general conditions for a mechanism
to be ex ante efficient, which includes a demonstration of Chatterjee and Samuelson’s
probability of trade result, that the k = 12 -double auction maximizes the expected gains
from trade for the uniform [0,1] distribution.
34In the proof above we have used the fact that U(1) = v(k) = v(1−k). Total surplus is
pinned down because v and total surplus are proportional. Recall from our discussion in
Section 2.4.2 that in general our method does not require fixing the total surplus, although
this will certainly achieve the result.
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mechanism kˆ reduces the utilities of all but highest type of buyer, reducing
rents and instilling a greater level of virtual competition while simultaneously
fixing the total volume of trade. Our methods demonstrate that the seller
prefers kˆ to (1 − kˆ). Can we say more? To derive the result that k = 0
is optimal, we first use the fact that from Proposition 2.5.2 we need only
consider k ∈ [0, 12 ]. Now observe the effect of reducing k from k = 12 , given
that the volume of trade v(k) and hence Uk(1) = v(k) are increasing in
k. Using the criterion of strict SOSD, it is straightforward to show that
increasing convexity (i.e. reducing utilities) remains advantageous despite
the fact that it reduces the volume of trade, and thus total surplus.
Proposition 2.5.3. For k ∈ (0, 12 ], decreasing k increases the seller’s prof-
its. Given Proposition 2.5.2, the seller’s profits are maximized by setting
k = 0.
From (2.27) and our distributional assumptions the variation must sat-
isfy
2
∫ θ
θ
dUk(x)
dk
dx > (1− x0)dU
k(1)
dk
2
d
dk
∫ θ
θ
U(x)f(x)dx > (1− x0)v′(k)
d
dk
EX [U(x)] >
(1− x0)
2
(1− 2k)
8
(2.29)
Proof. The second line follows from Uk(1) = v(k) and f(x) = 1 ∀x un-
der the uniform distribution. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) show that
EX [U(x)] = (1 + k)2(2 − k), so the inequality holds ∀k, x0 by a tedious
calculation. Reducing k therefore increases the seller’s expected profits for
k ∈ (0, 12 ], which combined with Proposition 2.5.2 ensures that k = 0 is
optimal ∀k.
2.6 Monopoly Pricing as the Optimal Mechanism
The correspondence between the optimal mechanisms of Myerson (1981)
and Williams (1987) can be broadly described as follows; the seller prefers to
earn monopoly rents than to surrender pricing power and earn information
rents. Despite the significant body of literature devoted to the classifica-
tion of incentive compatibility under different information structures, this
observation, and more generally, the effect of market power on mechanism
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design under two-sided private information has not to this point been ade-
quately explained. Arguably this is due to the fact that differences in pricing
rules typically do not map monotonically into differences in allocation rules,
making employment of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem problematic. Our
analysis represents a first step in addressing these problems. We have intro-
duced new techniques to deal with the comparison of mechanisms in which
allocation rules cannot be interim ranked in every eventuality. These tools
have proven effective for the analysis of monopoly pricing, because market
power is described by the shape of the allocation rule, rather than its values.
Monopoly pricing is a powerful device because it reduces the set of buyer
types who win with positive probability. For buyers who do win, there are
fewer lower types one could have masqueraded as and won in equilibrium,
and thus less surplus required to induce incentive compatibility. This in-
crease in virtual competition reduces the information rents of the buyers in
the seller’s favour.
In Essays II and III, the interdependence between the valuations on each
side of the market hinders the principal’s ability to implement monopoly
pricing, such that the conclusions derived here for the IPV setting cannot be
extended. We therefore view the ‘adversarial’ nature of the non-cooperative
bargaining solution found here to be relevant only for parties whose prefer-
ences are absolutely determined.
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Chapter 3
Auctions with an Informed
Seller: Signalling
3.1 Disclosed vs Secret Reserve Prices
As we discussed in Section 1, in auction theory the seller’s valuation and
reserve price are typically treated as publicly known. Within the standard
framework of Independent Private Values (IPV) models, these impositions
do not restrict the predictions of the theory in any significant way. For
example, bidding one’s value remains a weakly dominant strategy in an
English or Second Price Sealed Bid auction for any set of bidder beliefs
regarding the seller’s preferences or the reserve price.1 Further, as was shown
in our first essay, the seller cannot use her private information to extract any
more rents than she could if her valuation were known; the optimal auction
of Myerson (1981) remains optimal when the seller’s valuation is private
information. The standard paradigm of IPV models therefore instructs a
seller as to the reserve she should select, but gives her no reason to favour
disclosing or withholding it.
This is surprising given the pervasiveness of secret reserve prices. In
many market situations bidders do not know the reserve when they are bid-
ding, and may even be unsure as to whether one exists. Ashenfelter (1989)
comments on this phenomenon in auctions for wine and art; ‘...every item
is hammered down and treated as though it were sold. Only after the auc-
tion does the auctioneer reveal whether and at what price the item may have
actually been sold. In short, the auctioneers do not reveal the reserve price
1Provided bidders incur no participation costs.
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and make it as difficult as they can for bidders to infer it.’ This behaviour
is also common in auctions of real estate in New South Wales. The NSW
Office of Fair Trading website reports that ‘the seller will nominate a re-
serve price which is usually not told to the interested buyers.’2 One possible
explanation for the discrepancy between the IPV theory and auction design
in practice is the specification of private values. In particular the standard
models ignore the fact that the seller’s pricing decisions, and announcements
of those decisions can influence buyers’ opinions regarding the quality of a
good. In many situations the seller, as a market expert or as custodian of
the object holds private information as to its quality.3 It is then reasonable
that a buyer’s estimate of the value of the good would by influenced by the
seller’s assessment. To the extent that the seller’s valuation, and thus the
reserve price she will set are strictly increasing in her signal, an announced
reserve price represents an indirect announcement of this information. It is
of interest to know whether the seller benefits from making such announce-
ments in this context, or should rather use a secret reserve price. Cai, Riley,
and Ye (2007) have characterized the separating equilibrium that describes
reserve price signalling through disclosure before bidding commences. In
this essay we compare the expected profits to the seller from immediate an-
nouncement of the reserve as in their model to those under two different
secret reserve regimes;
(EN) Envelope: The seller, upon observing her signal and before bidding
commences, selects a reserve price, but it is kept secret, sealed in an
envelope, to be revealed once bidding has ended. In the event of non-
clearance at auction, the reserve is announced as a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the winner.
(WS) Wait and See: The reserve is selected and revealed once bidding ends.
In the event of non-clearance at auction, the reserve represents a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the winner.
A celebrated result in auction theory seems applicable here;4
2See NSW Office of Fair Trading; Reserve Prices, Website:
http://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/realestaterenting/buyingselling/buyingatauction.html.
3This is often referred to as the ‘lemons’ problem, and was first addressed by Akerlof
(1970).
4The general argument and several implications for revenue rankings in the various
auction forms were originally presented in Milgrom and Weber (1982a). Their Theorem 7
derives the result for the announcement of verifiable information in a Second Price Sealed
Bid (SPSB) auction.
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Theorem 3.1.1. Linkage Principle (Milgrom and Weber (1982a), infor-
mal statement5): If signals are independent, any two auctions generate the
same expected profits to the seller in symmetric equilibria. The direct an-
nouncement of verifiable information has no effect on the seller’s expected
profits.
A casual application of this result suggests that the seller should have
no preference between announcing the reserve price (and thus, indirectly
her private information) and keeping it secret, provided bidders interpret
announcements correctly so that the ordering of bidders and thus symmetry
is preserved.6 We demonstrate that this intuition is incorrect. The allocation
rule of an auction specifies not only an ordering of players (i.e. selects a
‘winner’), but also defines the rules of trade between buyer and seller, that
is, the reserve price. The problems of reserve price selection and information
disclosure cannot be separated (and thus the Linkage Principle cannot be
applied) because both affect the incentive constraints of the seller. The set
of allocation rules that can be implemented in equilibrium is changed by the
timing of information announcements.
A significant part of our analysis examines whether different actions
(immediate or later announcement) implementing the same strategy (re-
serve price) are mappings from incentive compatible allocation rules. In the
standard theory, one can remain agnostic about the role of the reserve in
price determination, since for a given reserve price any of the common auc-
tion forms will induce the same equilibrium allocation rule, and hence the
same expected revenues.7 It does not matter whether the reserve is a direct
monopoly price setting device as in an English or SPSB auction, or an in-
direct type-selecting device, as in a First Price Sealed Bid (FPSB) auction.
In our model, these considerations matter. For example, the conventional
set-up of the English auction involves the reserve price acting as a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the winner in the event of non-clearance at auction.8
5The above is an informally stated special case of the Linkage Principle result. Our
focus in the current section is on the implications of the theorem for the information
disclosure problem in the particular environment we shall study. We therefore withhold a
more rigorous statement of the result and direct the reader to Milgrom and Weber (1982a),
Theorem 7.
6Here we address the case in which there is no impartial third party who can be
costlessly employed to verify quality.
7See Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981).
8At least, this is the treatment the reserve usually receives in auction theory. It is
this property that leads the seller to act like monopolist, setting a price above her private
valuation/marginal cost, see Bulow and Roberts (1989). The reserve price offer is also
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Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) also address reserve prices of this form. In this
essay we remain faithful to this structure by considering secret reserves as
representing the ability to delay the announcement of a reserve until the
offer stage, as in the EN and WS regimes. In our third essay we address the
most extreme form of a secret reserve, one that never determines the price
since it is never announced.
Whenever the seller announces her reserve price, she wants to claim
favourable information, i.e. high quality. Conditioning on a given set of
bidder beliefs about the reserve price rule, the seller can always announce
a higher reserve to falsely represent higher quality. On the other hand, the
incentive to do this is tempered by a reduction in the volume of sales. The
higher the true quality, and thus seller’s reservation value of the good, the
less she loses from increasing the reserve and not selling it. Under fairly
permissive conditions, it is possible to find prices where these incentives are
balanced, so that signalling can occur and information can be completely
revealed in equilibrium. However Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) show that under
immediate announcement of the reserve a lower level of trade (and profits)
are realized than if the seller’s information were publicly known.9 We derive
the separating equilibria of the EN and WS regimes, and demonstrate that
later announcement, to the seller’s detriment, shifts the undesirable charac-
teristics of signalling from the bidding stage to the negotiation that follows
the auction.
For a given reserve price strategy ; (1) Bids clear the reserve less often
at auction under secret reserve regimes than under immediate disclosure.
In the separating equilibrium under immediate disclosure, bidders learn the
seller’s information before the auction and so bid their valuations. Bids are
less likely to clear any given reserve price under secrecy, since at the margin–
i.e. for signal values such that a given bidder’s valuation would just reach
the reserve–her bid under secrecy instead incorporates ‘bad news’, condi-
tioning on all values of S that are low enough to be consistent with her bid
clearing the reserve. However; (2) After accounting for transactions that
vital for the English auction to represent an implementation of the optimal auction of
Myerson (1981).
9This is true for all except the lowest type of seller. They also demonstrate that the
reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders even with independent signals. This
is in contrast to the optimal reserve price under complete information and independence
which is not a function of N . Jullien and Mariotti (2006) prove the existence of adverse
selection in a very similar model for less general valuation functions than Cai, Riley, and
Ye (2007). They show that the announced reserve price/monopoly mechanism can be less
ex ante efficient than a second-price auction facilitated through an uninformed monopoly
broker who buys from the seller and sells to the bidders after soliciting a fee.
46
occur though the reserve price offer the allocation rule is preserved (i.e. the
Linkage Principle can be applied) and these mechanisms generate the same
expected profits. Expected profits to the seller are the same for a given
reserve price strategy under these regimes, because any differences in the
bidders’ estimates of S are resolved in expectation through the announce-
ment of the reserve that occurs in the negotiation game. Thus (2) can be
viewed as an application of the Linkage Principle; For a given allocation
rule information effects do not influence the seller’s expected profits under
independence. It is the combination of (1) and (2) that allows us to perform
a comparative static on reserve price selection in the separating equilibria of
these regimes. (1) and (2) together imply that a greater share of profits are
accrued through sale at the reserve price for a given reserve strategy under
EN and WS than for immediate disclosure. This shifts more importance to
the reserve price announcement under EN and WS and thus requires that
signalling is even more costly to be credible in equilibrium. The prevalence
of secret reserves cannot be explained in our framework as representing the
ability to delay announcement. If a reserve will be announced eventually,
then the sooner the better.
In related work, Vincent (1995) and Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) have
also addressed the prevalence of secret reserves through a departure from the
IPV framework. Vincent demonstrates in a note that an announced reserve
price restricts bidder participation. A secret reserve therefore aggregates
more bidder information increasing Linkage Principle effects to the seller’s
advantage. His model relies on affiliation style arguments and endogenous
entry which we do not consider here. Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) con-
sider secret reserves as a means of facilitating non-commitment to a given
reserve. This allows a seller who has perfect information as to the object’s
common value to signal greater value for a future resale. Their model differs
from ours since their common values specification implies that there can be
no separating equilibrium in announced reserve prices that generates posi-
tive trade (see their Section III(A)). In contrast we analyze the comparative
performance of secret reserves when full revelation is possible. Further, in
our third essay we show that secrecy can generate greater profits from a
given set of bidders than disclosure in a one-shot game.10
10It should be noted that departures from the standard utility framework have also
been shown by Brisset and Naegelen (2006) and Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) to be
possible explanations for a seller’s preference for secret reserve prices. The former identify
risk-averse bidders as preferring secret reserves, the latter use reference-based utility. An
announced reserve triggers a reduction in utility related to the premium of the price paid
over the reserve. This induces a lower probability of clearance for a given reserve price,
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Despite the prevalence of secret reserves, their is little empirical evi-
dence regarding their optimality. For the most part, this is due to the lack
of a strong theoretical model against which one can test observed behaviour.
Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel, and Vuong (1994) and Eklo¨f and Lunander (2003)
for example find that secret reserves hurt the seller, however their results are
unsurprising given that they compare actual bidding behaviour with simula-
tions generated from an original hypothesis of Independent Private Values.
As such they do not tell us anything that a simple understanding of the
IPV model does not. Since we allow for interdependencies, their conclusions
have no bearing here. In a more promising study, Katkar and Reiley (2006)
conduct a field experiment by selling matched pairs of Poke´mon cards using
the same reserve price, half secret, half disclosed. They find that secret re-
serves deter ‘serious’ bidders who can instead compete under the disclosed
reserve, knowing that they are ‘in the running’. Given that the cards were
purchased for the experiment at an average price of $7.19,11 the value of
the good is unlikely to generate the common value effects we examine here.
Arguably preferences for Poke´mon cards are better described by the IPV
model. These findings aside, we take the Wilson Doctrine12 seriously, ar-
guing that practitioners usually know what they are doing, and that it is
the job of the theorist to explain why they are correct. One implication of
our results (Essay III) is that we would expect secret reserves to be more
popular when those setting them are experts, which seems sensible given
the practice of auction houses.
We proceed with some definitions and a description of the rules and tim-
ing of each regime. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 characterize equilibrium behaviour
in the negotiation stage, and equilibrium bidding under the secret reserve
regimes. Section 3.5 compares the probability of allocation and expected
profits across the three regimes for a fixed reserve price strategy. Section 3.6
reviews Cai et. al.’s treatment of the separating equilibrium under immedi-
ate disclosure, and provides sufficient conditions for a profit ranking with the
EN and WS regimes. We then derive equilibria in these regimes in Section
3.7 and prove that immediate disclosure dominates later announcement of a
reserve price. Section 3.8 recaps the results and discusses the possibility of
improving upon the secret reserve mechanisms, which is the subject of the
third essay in Chapter 4.
reducing the effectiveness of announced reserves.
11See Katkar and Reiley (2006) pp. 7.
12See Krishna (2002) pp. 75.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Preliminaries
The set of players is given by I = {0, 1, ..., N}, N ≥ 2 where Player
0 is the seller, and I \ {0} is the set of bidders. Throughout the paper,
the set of bidders is fixed and common knowledge. Each bidder receives a
real-valued signal distributed on [θ, θ] according to F with density f .13 We
require that the hazard rates on the Xi’s are increasing. The seller’s signal
S is distributed according to FS with density fS on [θS , θS ]. All signals are
statistically independent.
The valuation of each bidder i is symmetric, non-negative and contin-
uous, given by Vi = v(Xi, S). The function v is assumed to be strictly
increasing in bidder i’s own signal (Xi) as well as that of the seller (S).
Thus, each bidder cares about the seller’s signal, in addition to her own, but
not about the signals of the other bidders. We define the expected valuation
of a bidder with signal x when S ≤ s as
w(x, s) ≡ ES [v(x, S)|S ≤ s]
The seller’s valuation is v0(S), which is also strictly increasing. We shall also
assume that v is separable in the private and common value components,
and that d
2v(x,s)
dx2 ≤ 0.14
3.2.2 The Game
A single indivisible object is to be sold by way of an English auction,
to be modelled in the familiar ‘clock’ format.15 We compare the ex ante
expected profits to the seller in such an auction given her choice among
several reserve price regimes. Events unfold in four stages.
Stage 1: Reserve Regime Selection
The seller decides, before knowing the realization of her signal, which of
the following three reserve price regimes she will employ.
13Again realisations of a variable will be written in lower case, uppercase letters denote
the random variable itself.
14The preceding conditions on signals and valuation functions represent a special case
of Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007). They assume the X’s are affiliated (but independent of S),
and they allow valuations to depend upon the signals of other bidders.
15This set-up is standard in the literature: see Milgrom and Weber (1982). Cai, Riley,
and Ye (2007) model a Second Price Sealed Bid auction. In our set-up valuations do not
depend on the signals of other bidders, so under immediate disclosure these auctions are
equivalent.
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(FD) Full Disclosure: The seller, upon observing her signal and before bid-
ding commences, selects and announces a reserve price.
(EN) Envelope: The seller, upon observing her signal and before bidding
commences, selects a reserve price, but it is kept secret, sealed in an
envelope, to be revealed once bidding has ended. Thus, the seller is
committed to this secret reserve.
(WS) Wait and See: The seller selects and reveals her reserve once bidding
ends.
The seller publicly announces the regime she chooses. The regimes EN
and WS are alike in the sense that they are secret reserve regimes: the
particular value of the reserve is unknown to bidders during the bidding
process. However, once bidding has ended, all of the regimes become similar
because the reserve is public information at that point.
Stage 2: Signals Observed
Once the seller has selected among the three reserve price regimes, all
players observe their signals. The seller then selects a reserve price under
regimes FD and EN, announcing it under FD and privately committing to
it without announcing it under EN.
Stage 3: Bidding
The bidders bid in an English auction. The price at the auction ascends
with the bidders indicating their continued participation at each level. A
bidder who is willing to buy the object at any price p is said to be active
at p. Bidders exit publicly, voluntarily and irrevocably. As soon as only
one bidder remains, bidding ends and this individual is said to have won
the auction. The price at which this takes place is the auction price. We
sometimes refer to this stage as the bidding game.
Stage 4: Negotiation and Allocation
Under EN, the reserve is now revealed. Under WS, the reserve is selected
and announced. We say the reserve is cleared if the auction price is at least
as high as the (by now public) reserve.16 In that event, the highest bidder
at the auction wins the object at the auction price. If the reserve is not
cleared, we enter a simple negotiation game. The reserve price acts as a
take-it-or-leave-it offer by the seller to the highest bidder. If the highest
bidder accepts the offer, she buys the object at the reserve price.
16 Note this treatment of FD is without loss in generality; bidders incur no participation
cost so bidding then withdrawing below the reserve is equivalent to not participating.
50
3.2.3 Equilibrium
A seller’s reserve price strategy is an increasing function R : [θS , θS ] →
%+, so a typical reserve price r can be written as r = R(s). Given a reserve
price strategy R, a secret reserve bidding strategy is a symmetric increas-
ing function βR : [θ, θ] → %+ in the secret reserve regimes. Under FD,
the reserve price announcement that occurs before bidding represents an
announcement of the seller’s private information sˆ ∈ [θS , θS ], which bid-
ders will use in addition to their own information in forming their bids. In
this regime, a disclosed reserve bidding strategy is a symmetric increasing
function βˆR : [θ, θ] × [θS , θS ] → %+. A bidder negotiation strategy is an
increasing function PR : [θ, θ] × [θS , θS ] → %+ that represents the highest
price she will accept as a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the reserve price given
the reserve price strategy R, the associated announcement sˆ ∈ [θS , θS ] and
her signal x ∈ [θ, θ].
A signalling equilibrium is defined as a triple (R,βaR, P
a
R) for
a ∈ {FD,EN,WS} that are best responses in the following sense. For the
seller, the strategy R is a best response given her signal s and the symmetric
behaviour of the set of bidders under βaR in the bidding game and under P
a
R
in the negotiation game. R is therefore a best response in the selection of a
minimum type of bidder who will clear the reserve under βaR, and accept the
reserve price offer under P aR. In these three regimes, R is also a best response
in terms of the seller’s type announcement sˆ = R−1(r) and the influence on
bidders’ behaviour through P aR in each regime, and also through β
FD
R in
FD. βENR and β
WS
R are best responses for a bidder given her signal, and
the bidding behaviour of others under the reserve price strategy R and the
allocation rule of the regime. The same is true for FD, except that βFDR is a
best response given one’s signal and that of the seller under R, where sˆ = s,
so βFDR = βˆR|sˆ=s. P
a
R is similarly a best response for a bidder given x and
sˆ = s, which is known given the reserve price strategy R once the reserve
offer r is announced. Next, we consider equilibrium behaviour in the final
stage of the mechanism, the negotiation game.
3.3 Negotiation and Allocation
Recall that the object goes to the highest bidder at the auction price
provided this is no lower than the (by now public) reserve. Should the
auction price be too low, we enter a negotiation stage where the reserve price
acts as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the highest bidder. It is clear that the
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optimal action of the highest bidder at this stage is to accept the offer if and
only if her valuation conditional on learning the reserve and thus s is at least
as high as the offer, so we have P aR(x, s) = v(x, s) for a = {FD,EN,WS}.
For a reserve price strategy R and a seller’s signal s, we define the signal
value sR(x) by
sR(x) := sup{s : v(x, s) ≥ R(s)} (3.1)
Thus, sR(x) represents the highest seller signal such that a valuation meets
or exceeds the reserve. Whenever sR(x) ∈ [θS , θS ] exists and is strictly
increasing, in equilibrium a bidder with signal x will accept any take-it-or-
leave-it offer up to R(sR(x)). The key to this is that R is strictly increasing,
so that announcement of a particular reserve allows bidders to ‘learn’ s by
inverting R. To address the properties of sR(x), consider the closely related
signal value mR(s) defined as
mR(s) := inf{x : v(x, s) ≥ R(s)} (3.2)
For signalling to occur in equilibrium the probability of allocation (selling
the good) must be decreasing in the reserve price. Otherwise, the seller
can raise the reserve price and costlessly signal better information.17 This
requirement is equivalent to the statement that mR(s) ∈ [θ, θ] exists and
is strictly increasing in s. sR(x) and mR(s) are inverses, so in a signalling
equilibrium sR(x) exists for x ≥ mR(θS). We shall suppose further that
mR(θS) = θ, so sR(x) is strictly increasing for x ≥ mR(θS). As we shall see,
this statement is without loss of generality for our ranking of the FD, EN and
WS regimes. The reason is that taking the lowest type seller for whom trade
occurs with zero probability, say s′, we have mR(s′) = θ, and the good will
never be allocated for S > s′ under FD. Our analysis can therefore be viewed
as addressing the set that remains after these high types have withdrawn
from the market. One of our main findings is that the excluded set of seller
types can only be larger under the EN and WS regimes, so consideration
of the set that leaves the market under FD only serves to consolidate our
profit ranking result; that FD dominates EN and WS. In what follows, we
therefore assume for simplicity (unless otherwise stated) that mR(s) exists
and is strictly increasing for all s, and sR(x) exists and is strictly increasing
∀x ≥ mR(θS).
17We show more rigourously that this condition will hold when we derive separating
equilibria in reserve prices later.
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3.4 Bidding under Secret Reserve Regimes
3.4.1 Participation
The bidding games in the secret reserve regimes look very similar; bidders
know their own signal and are competing against each other in the presence
of an unknown reserve. A bidding function in an English auction under
a secret reserve regime is a symmetric function βR that specifies for each
bidder signal X given the reserve price rule R a price βR(X) at which she
will withdraw from the auction. Our task is to find particular functions that
are best responses for a bidder given the symmetric play of other bidders, the
reserve price strategy R and (where appropriate) the best response function
of the bidder in the negotiation stage that will follow.
Given an increasing reserve price strategyR, a natural starting point is to
ask whether a bidder should participate in the auction or not. Equivalently,
we could ask whether her bid clears the reserve with positive probability.18
It is important to note that in secret reserve regimes the definition of a
‘serious’ bid is weaker than when the reserve is public information. Since
the particular value of the reserve is unknown to a bidder, she views her bid
as ‘serious’ as long as it exceeds the lowest possible reserve price. Now the
reserve represents the lowest price at which a bidder can acquire the object,
so a necessary condition for participation is that for some s, v(x, s) ≥ R(s).
If this is not the case, then winning the object always results in an ex post
negative payoff to the bidder, and she will not want to participate in the
auction.19 By the definition of sR(x) in (3.1) and our condition that mR(s)
exists, is increasing and mR(θS) = θ, for every type of bidder x ≥ mR(θS)
there exist prices which ensure an ex post positive profit, so a necessary
condition for participation is achieved. In the derivation of equilibrium
bidding strategies in each of the secret reserve regimes that will follow, we
verify that this condition is also sufficient. We therefore have the following;
Observation 3.4.1. In secret reserve regimes, a bidder submits a ‘serious’
bid, i.e. one she believes will clear the reserve with positive probability, as
long as sR(x) is defined for that bidder type, or x ≥ mR(θS).
From this point on, we consider the equilibrium behaviour of participat-
ing bidders. We shall now present our analysis of bidding behaviour in the
secret reserve regimes.
18See Footnote 16.
19In this scenario we assume that the bidder would submit a bid below R(θS).
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3.4.2 Bidding under the EN and WS Regimes
Given an increasing reserve price strategy R and an increasing symmetric
bidding function βR, we can express the expected profit of a bidder with
signal x facing an unknown reserve from announcing type z when all others
announce truthfully as20
E[Π(z, x)] =
∫ z
θ
∫ esR(y)
θS
[v(x, s)− βR(y)]fS(s)fY (y)dsdy
+
∫ z
θ
∫ max{sR(x),esR(y)}
esR(y) [v(x, s)−R(s)]fS(s)fY (y)dsdy
(3.3)
where Y and fY represent the highest of N − 1 draws from F and the
density of this variable respectively. Thus βR(y) is the highest bid of one’s
competitors. The signal value s˜R(x) is defined as follows21
s˜R(x) := R−1(min{βR(x), R(θS)}) (3.4)
We shall suppose for now that R−1(βR(x)) ≥ θS for x ≥ mR(θS) so s˜R(x) is
always defined for participating bidders. This will be verified in the deriva-
tion of the equilibrium bidding function.22 The first component of Equation
(3.3) represents the expected profits from announcing type z and winning the
auction at a price above the unknown reserve. This involves taking expected
values over the events in which one wins (Y ≤ z), and the best competitor’s
bid clears the reserve, so βR(y) ≥ R(s) or equivalently S ≤ s˜R(y) so the
price paid upon winning will be the auction price. When βR(y) ≤ R(θS)
we have s˜R(x) ≤ θS and the bidder incorporates the ‘bad news’ about the
seller’s information that is consistent with the reserve being cleared in order
to avoid the winner’s curse. Otherwise, the first term involves the uncon-
ditional expectation over S. The second term corresponds to the expected
profits from receiving a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the reserve price, which
occurs when one wins the auction, but at a price (highest competitor’s bid)
below the reserve. The boundary terms reflect the fact that this event
only yields surplus to the bidder when the reserve may not be cleared, so
s˜R(y) < θS , and she would accept the reserve price offer, which from (3.1) is
equivalent to S ≤ sR(x). If the values of Y and X are such that the winner
20Here we appeal to the Revelation Principle.
21Since this value depends on the equilibrium bidding function, it will differ across the
secret reserve regimes. For notational simplicity we do not index this dependence, the
relevance to a particular regime will be made clear in each case.
22See proof of Proposition 3.4.1.
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would not accept the reserve price offer when the reserve is not cleared, the
boundary terms set this surplus equal to zero. Maximizing with respect to
z and solving the first order condition yields the symmetric equilibrium of
the bidding game, recorded in the proposition below.
Proposition 3.4.1. Given the reserve price strategy R and associated value
sR(x), the lowest participating bidder, type mR(θS) bids β
EN,WS
R (mR(θS)) =
R(θS) in the EN and WS regimes. For types above, the symmetric equilib-
rium bidding function is given by
βEN,WSR (x) :=
 b = w(x,R−1(b)) +
R sR(x)
R−1(b)[v(x,s)−R(s)]fS(s)ds
F (R−1(b)) if R(θS) ≥ ES [v(x, S)]
ES [v(x, S)] if R(θS) ≤ ES [v(x, S)]
(3.5)
Proof. See appendix, Section 5.2.
High type bidders who always clear the reserve bid their unconditional
expected value since they imply no bad news from clearing the reserve.
For the remaining types, the first term of the bidding function is the ex-
pected value of the object conditional on clearing the secret reserve with
βR(x) = βR(y). The bidder adjusts her valuation of the good since beating
the reserve implies an upper bound on the seller’s signal S. The second
component represents the option value of learning the reserve, and hence
one’s valuation, from an offer in the negotiation stage. Having observed
an offer R(s) and learned her valuation v(x, s), the winner can do no bet-
ter than to accept the price iff v(x, s) ≥ R(s) or, from the perspective of
a bidder who does not yet know what this offer will be, S ≤ sR(x). The
second term therefore incorporates the expected value of the surplus from
the negotiation game. Note that the upper boundary term in the option
component of the bid has been replaced with sR(x), which implies that
sR(x) > s˜R(x), so that the option value of receiving the reserve price offer
is positive for x : ES [v(x, S)] ≤ R(θS). The intuition is that bidders re-
spond to the fact that they can avoid the winner’s curse by symmetrically
underbidding; rather than overcommit in the auction, bidders leave ‘room’
for trades to occur in the negotiation stage when they will know the true
value of S. This is a necessary condition for equilibrium bidding in the EN
and WS regimes that has very important consequences for the ranking of
expected profits relative to FD which will be developed in Section 3.5. We
now further explore the intuition of the underbidding phenomenon in terms
of the role of private seller information.
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In the secret reserve regimes, the equilibrium bid is independent of S,
so it will typically differ from the true valuation v(x, s), leading to different
bidding behaviour than if the value of S were known. In particular, players
will bid too little for high values of S and too much for low values. It is im-
portant to note that the bidding behaviour outlined above is not a strategic
response to a secret reserve per se, but to the beliefs that are induced about
the value of the object when one wins under a secret reserve. To demonstrate
the influence of private seller information on the auction outcome in terms
of a pure information effect, we can fix a particular mechanism, i.e. a regime
and reserve price strategy R, and compare bidding behaviour in this regime
across two exogenously given scenarios; when S is public information, and
when it is unknown to bidders. The example that follows in Section 3.4.3 is
dedicated to such an exploration. Section 3.5 then compares the probability
of reserve clearance for a fixed regime and reserve price strategy when S is
unknown to that when it is public information in more general terms. It
turns out that even though bids can be higher in either situation depending
on the realisation of S, for a given reserve price strategy R, the reserve is
cleared more often when S is public information in every realisation. The
example that now follows is a demonstration of this property. We then show
that this interesting but somewhat artificial result can be simply translated
to a ranking of reserve clearance rates across regimes; for fixed R the reserve
is cleared more often under FD than in the secret reserve regimes due to
pure information effects.
3.4.3 Example: Reserve Clearance
A single indivisible object is offered for sale by a seller to N bidders by
way of an English auction under the EN regime. Let these players receive
signals S, X1, . . . , XN that are all distributed identically, independently and
uniformly on [0, 1]. The bidders have symmetric valuations of the form
Vi = Xi + S
Say that the seller’s reserve price strategy is
R(S) =
3
2
S
In order to examine the effect of private seller information on bidders’ be-
haviour, we now want to investigate how a representative bidder would be-
have in this auction if the value of S were common knowledge. In this sce-
nario, a bidder with signal x has a ‘complete’ valuation, and in an English
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auction she can do no better than to bid this value:23
bˆ = v(x, s) = x+ s
The lowest type of bidder that can clear the reserve when the seller’s type
is s is then given by x = s2 . Does this type of bidder clear the reserve when
S is unknown? This can be simply tested by asking whether type x = s2
is active when the price reaches b = R(2x). Substituting R(sR(x)) into the
bidding function, the option component disappears because the option is
worth nothing if one wins at R(s). For type x to be active at R(sR(x)),
we must have the condition b ≤ w(x,R−1(b)) . At any particular price b, a
bidder with signal x can evaluate the expected value conditional on winning
the object at b. This is given by
w(x,R−1(b)) = x+ E[S|S ≤ 2
3
b]
Given our distributional assumptions, type x is only active for unknown S
if
b ≤ x+ 2
3
.
b
2
b ≤ 3
2
x
But of course b = R(sR(x)) = 322x = 3x, so the above inequality is not
satisfied. Since we demonstrated that type x is inactive at R(sR(x)) when S
is unknown for arbitrary x, the probability of reserve clearance at auction is
always higher when S is public information. Note that this phenomenon does
not follow from bids being universally larger when S is known. In fact, bids
can be higher in either situation depending on the value of S. For example,
taking s = 0 bids are higher for unknown S since βENR (x) ≥ 32x ≥ x = bˆ.
Rather, the reduced probability of reserve clearance is a general property
of secret reserve regimes that can be explained as a simple consequence of
the winner’s curse. For any realization of the reserve price R(s), type x
will bid her valuation v(x, s) if she knows the value of s. For unknown S,
bidders in the EN and WS regimes always leave ‘room’ for trades to occur
at the reserve price in the negotiation stage. Recalling the bidding function
from (3.5) the equilibrium bid contains an expected value component and
23Again, the fact that the secret reserve may be inferred by the bidders through their
knowledge of s plays no role here. As long as they incur no participation cost, their
dominant strategy is unchanged for any set of beliefs about the reserve price.
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an ‘option’ component. If it were possible for one’s bid to meet the secret
reserve under EN or WS where the true valuation, or equivalently, the bid for
known S would not, then for that type of bidder x we have R−1(b) ≥ sR(x).
By swapping the boundaries of the integral in the option term, the bidding
function can then be expressed as
βENR (x),β
WS
R (x) := b = w(x,R
−1(b))+
∫ R−1(b)
sR(x)
[R(s)− v(x, s)]f(s)ds
F (R−1(b))
(3.6)
Note that the option component is again positive by the definition of sR(x).
However, this means that at the point where the bid exactly meets the
secret reserve, the bidder would have paid for an option that has zero value;
she would never accept the reserve price offer (once announced), because
S > sR(x). In equilibrium bidders do not systematically bid too high,
they don’t pay a premium for a right they would never exercise. The option
component of the bid is only worth paying for if the secret reserve would not
be cleared, but, once announced, the reserve price offer would be accepted.
A necessary condition for this is that for unknown S the bid must be below
the highest price one would accept from a reserve price offer; one’s valuation.
Since it is a dominant strategy to bid one’s valuation when S is known, the
reserve must be cleared more often in the EN and WS auctions when S is
known. The bidder underestimates the value of the object at the margin
where S = s but all S ≤ s are consistent with her bid clearing the reserve.
The reserve is therefore cleared more often when S is public information
in all secret reserve regimes. The next section is dedicated to a formal
statement of this proposition, and links this result to reserve clearance in
the FD regime.
3.5 Reserve Clearance and Seller Profits for Fixed
R
3.5.1 The Probability of Reserve Clearance for Fixed R
Recall that reserve clearance in an English auction occurs whenever the
second highest bid meets the reserve. Then in a given regime (and fix-
ing the reserve price strategy R) the effect of private seller information on
the probability of reserve clearance can be described by ranking the lowest
bidder signal value that facilitates reserve clearance when S is public infor-
mation, and when it is unknown. When S is known to bidders, they have
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complete valuations. In an English auction, bidders have a weakly domi-
nant strategy to bid this valuation under any reserve regime. The relevant
threshold signal for reserve clearance in this case is mR(s), the lowest bid-
der type whose valuation exceeds the reserve given the seller’s signal s, as
introduced in Section 3.3. When the seller’s information is private, bidding
behaviour and therefore the set of reserve clearing bidders depends on the
equilibrium bidding function in the regime. We therefore define given regime
a = {FD,EN,WS} and fixed R the value m˜aR(s), where
m˜aR(s) :=
{
inf{x : βaR(x) ≥ R(s)} if S ≤ R−1(βaR(θ))
θ if S ≥ R−1(βaR(θ))
This represents the lowest bidder signal value that results in reserve clear-
ance given the bidding strategy βaR when S = s, if reserve clearance is
possible at all. Otherwise the seller sets probability zero to such an event
(m˜aR(s) = θ achieves this). Given this definition, it is clear that the relative
probabilities of reserve clearance in a regime for known and unknown S will
be described by the ranking of m˜aR(s) and mR(s). Moreover, it is simple
to illustrate that this intuition also applies across regimes. Under FD, S is
known to bidders at the time they place their bids. In an English auction,
bidders will therefore bid their valuations, leading to outcomes in the bidding
game that are equivalent to those when S is specified as common knowledge.
We therefore have m˜FDR (s) = mR(s). We now prove the following result.
Proposition 3.5.1. For any given strictly increasing R and for every value
of s;
(i) The reserve is cleared at least as often in the secret reserve regimes when
S is public information than when it is unknown, or mR(s) ≤ m˜aR(s).
(ii) The reserve is cleared at least as often in FD as in the secret reserve
regimes.
Proof. For (i), we have proven in Lemma 5.2.1 (see the appendix Section
5.2) that sR(x) ≥ s˜R(x) for all participating bidders, with strict inequality
for x > mR(θS). Just as sR and mR are inverses, so too are s˜R and m˜R.
We therefore have m˜R(x) ≥ mR(x) for participating bidders, with strict
inequality for x > mR(θS). For x < mR(θS), the reserve is never cleared in
either regime. (ii) follows from (i), given that m˜FDR (s) = mR(s).
So, for a fixed reserve price strategy, differences between the regimes
can be summarized in terms of a pure information effect; FD facilitates an
announcement of S, which means that the reserve is cleared more often under
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FD than in the secret reserve regimes. From this point on (unless otherwise
specified), we shall return to the structure which we initially specified, that
where S is private information for the seller and can only be made public
through her actions. The next subsection investigates the repercussions of
(ii) for a profit ranking, again for a fixed reserve price strategy R. Despite
the difference in reserve clearance rates as described in (ii), after accounting
for sales in the negotiation stage the signalling regimes generate the same
expected profits to the seller.
This result may be viewed as a prediction of the Linkage Principle; the
disclosure of information has no effect on expected profits in symmetric
equilibria under statistical independence. This fact, combined with (ii) will
prove extremely useful to the ranking of expected profits in equilibrium in
these regimes. The results allow us to perform a comparative static on
the reserve prices that will be selected in a signalling equilibrium as the
share of profits from the negotiation game increases. This share is greater
under the secret reserve regimes, which further increases equilibrium reserve
prices relative to FD, so that immediate disclosure is preferable to later
announcement.
3.5.2 Ranking Expected Profits for Fixed R
In this section we compute expected profits to the seller in the EN
and WS regimes, and compare this to profits under FD for a fixed re-
serve price strategy R. Proposition 3.5.1 shows that mR(s) ≤ m˜aR(s) for
a = {EN,WS}. However, the lower probability of reserve clearance also
means a greater probability of receiving a reserve price offer in the EN and
WS regimes. We now prove that (fixing a reserve price strategy) this trade-
off is perfectly balanced by the expectations in the secret reserve bidding
function, which yields an equivalence between profits under FD, EN and
WS.
Proposition 3.5.2. For any strictly increasing R, the EN and WS regimes
yield the same expected profits to the seller as under FD.
Proof. The ex ante expected profit in EN and WS from using the increasing
secret reserve price strategy R and associatedmR given the bidding function
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βaR and associated m˜
a
R for a = {EN,WS} is given by24
E[Π(EN,WS)] =
∫ θS
θS
∫ θ
em [β(x)− v0(s)]f2(x)fS(s)dxds
+
∫ θS
θS
[F2(m˜)− F1(m)][R(s)− v0(s)]fS(s)ds
F1, F2, f1 and f2 represent the distribution functions of the highest and
second highest of the Xi’s and their densities respectively. These terms
represent the expected profits to the seller from sale at the auction price;
when the second highest bidder’s signal is above m˜, and from sale at the
reserve price; when the auction price is too low but the highest bidder’s
signal is above m so she will accept the reserve price offer.25 Changing the
order of integration in the first term and substituting in the equilibrium
bidding function from (3.5) obtains26
E[Π(EN,WS)] =
∫ θ
θ
∫ es(x)
θS
[w(x, s˜(x))− v0(s)]fS(s)f2(x)dsdx
+
∫ θ
θ
∫ es(x)
θS
∫ s(x)es(x) [v(x, s)−R(s)]fS(s)ds
FS(s˜(x))
f(s)f2(x)dsdx
+
∫ θS
θS
[F2(m˜)− F1(m)][R(s)− v0(s)]fS(s)ds
Recalling that w(x, s˜(x)) is the expected value conditional on S ≤ s˜(x),
integrating the first two terms over S then changing the order of integration
24In this section we suppress the dependence of mR(s) and emENR (s) on s, the subscript
R and superscript EN where appropriate, and similarly for WS. Note that under the
definition of em, if for some s; em(s) = θ the first term in the profit function disappears.
25Here we are using the fact that F1(.) < F2(.), and em ≥ m.
26From the arguments of Section 3.3 we consider reserve price strategies and seller
types such that s(x) ≤ θS so es(x) < θS and we use the bidding function for x : R(θS) ≥
ES [v(x, S)].
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the profit function becomes
E[Π(EN,WS)] =
∫ θ
θ
∫ s(x)
θS
[v(x, s)− v0(s)]fS(s)f2(x)ds
−
∫ θ
θ
∫ s(x)
es(x) [R(s)− v0(s)]fS(s)f2(x)dsdx
+
∫ θS
θS
[F2(m˜)− F1(m)][R(s)− v0(s)]fS(s)ds
=
∫ θS
θS
∫ θ
m
[v(x, s)− v0(s)]f2(x)fS(s)dxds
+
∫ θS
θS
[F2(m˜)− F2(m˜) + F2(m)− F1(m)][R(s)− v0(s)]fS(s)ds
= E[Π(FD)] (3.7)
The last line follows from noting that under FD players bid their values.
The seller therefore receives the second highest valuation when it exceeds
the reserve (X2 ≥ m), and sells the object at the reserve price when X1 ≥
m > X2.
In the EN and WS regimes the reserve is cleared less often than under
FD, however secrecy does not hurt the seller because she can still sell in the
negotiation stage when the reserve is not cleared at auction. Bidders then
incorporate the value of receiving this offer in their bids when the reserve is
secret, and their estimation of the value of receiving this offer is correct on
average. We could view this result as a corollary of Milgrom and Weber’s
(1982) Linkage Principle, in its weak form for independent signals. They
use this principle to demonstrate that the direct announcement of verifiable
information has no impact on expected revenues. Proposition 3.5.1(i) proves
that for any s, allocation in the bidding game is only affected by secrecy
since it reduces the probability of reserve clearance. The post auction offer
of the reserve price resolves any such differences, preserving the allocation
rule.27 In our result, the fixed reserve price strategy therefore plays the
dual roles of fixing the allocation rule and ensuring that the information is
verifiable so that the Linkage Principle applies. Alternatively, in equilibrium
the seller’s information cannot be made public ‘for free’ unless the value
27Proposition 3.5.1 also means that we don’t have to worry about a bidder paying too
much under secrecy, clearing the reserve when she would not purchase under complete
information.
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of S can be costlessly verified. While she may prefer for her type to be
known in terms of a pure information effect, the intuition of our example
and Proposition 3.5.2 can only be applied to exogenously given mechanisms.
Thus we have demonstrated that a secret reserve has no direct information
effects on expected profits. The seller must also however take into account
the fact that if S is to be made public, it will be via some mechanism
that is likely to distort equilibrium in other ways. The remainder of the
analysis in this essay compares possible methods (reserve price regimes) of
disseminating this information credibly, and the associated effects on reserve
price selection and hence profits.
Once we consider equilibrium reserve price selection, the equivalence
fails; Full Disclosure is preferable to EN and WS. Moreover, our analysis
will demonstrate that in equilibrium Full Disclosure is preferable despite
the fact that signals are independent, as a direct consequence of the Linkage
Principle/Proposition 3.5.2 and Proposition 3.5.1. While expected profits
are identical for fixed R, the share that arises from sale at the reserve price is
higher under secrecy for any s. Increasing the share increases the importance
of the reserve price announcement, and thus the incentive for the seller to
falsely claim better information. Later announcement of a reserve therefore
results in a higher equilibrium reserve price which reduces expected prof-
its. To explicitly compare these equilibria, we now review the treatment of
equilibrium under the benchmark case of Full Disclosure as per Cai, Riley,
and Ye (2007), and develop conditions for a profit ranking. In Section 3.7,
we analyze reserve price setting behaviour in the EN and WS regimes, then
apply our condition to prove that FD is preferable.
3.6 Full Disclosure (FD)
Recalling the definition of mR(s) from (3.2), the task is to specify a
reserve price strategy that results in a separating equilibrium under FD.
Cai et. al. (2007) express this problem as a maximization in terms of the
seller’s announced type sˆ, and the threshold type m subject to incentive
compatibility, so that m(sˆ) = m(s). It is known from Riley (1979) that if
the lowest type of informed agent selects an action that would be optimal
if her type were known, then this separating equilibrium is unique. In our
analysis of the signalling regimes FD and EN we restrict our attention to
such equilibria. The interim expected profit function for this problem under
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FD can be written as follows;
U(s, sˆ,m) =
∫ θ
m
[v(x, sˆ)− v0(s)]f2(x)dx+ [F2(m)− F1(m)][v(m, sˆ)− v0(s)]
Here F1 and F2 again represent the distributions of the first and second order
statistics of bidder types respectively, and v(m, sˆ) = R(sˆ) by definition. The
first component describes the interim expected profit from sale at the auction
price. The other component represents profits from the post auction take-it-
or-leave-it offer of the reserve price to the winning bidder. Taking the first
order conditions for m and sˆ obtains28
dU
dm
= f1(m)
[
v0(s)− v(m, sˆ) + dv
dx
|x=m
(F2(m)− F1(m)
f1(m)
)]
dU
dsˆ
=
dv
dsˆ
[1− F1(m)]
(3.8)
Define m∗ to be the be the solution to dUdm = 0 given that sˆ = s. Then m
∗
identifies the optimal reserve price under complete information.29
Theorem 3.6.1. (Cai et. al.) For separable v, there is a unique sepa-
rating equilibrium under Full Disclosure that is described by the differential
equation
dmFD
ds
=
dv
ds [1− F1(mFD)]
f1(mFD)
[
v(mFD, s)− v0(s)− dvdx |x=mFD
(
F2(mFD)−F1(mFD)
f1(mFD)
)]
with initial condition mFD(θS) = m∗FD(θS), if
d
dx
[
v(x, s)− dv(x, s)
dx
(F2(x)− F1(x)
f1(x)
)]
> 0 (3.9)
for all s.
Proof. See Cai et. al. Theorem 1 (2007).30
28Here we make use of our assumption that the valuation function v(x, s) is separable
in the private and common value components. Cai et. al. do not require this assumption.
29This solution is an analogue of the standard optimal auction reserve, the price that sets
virtual valuations equal to the seller’s valuation, see Myerson (1981). We use the phrase
‘complete information’ to describe the standard case in which the agents (bidders) have
private information but the seller’s preferences are commonly known. Similar terminology
is also used in Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992).
30Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) show that when signals are independent (3.9) is satisfied if
d2v(x,s)
dx2
< 0 for all s and the distribution of x is regular. Equation (3.9) is therefore also
satisfied for our model.
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In this equilibrium, the lowest type of seller chooses the reserve that is
optimal under complete information. It is straightforward to demonstrate
that every other type of seller selects a higher reserve price, and therefore a
higher threshold signal m than she would if her type were known to bidders.
A separating equilibrium solves31
d
dsˆ
[U(s, sˆ,m(sˆ))] =
(dU
dsˆ
)
|sˆ=s +
(dU
dm
)
|sˆ=s
(dm
ds
)
|sˆ=s = 0
Now dUdsˆ |sˆ=s > 0 for all s, and dmds > 0 at equilibrium. Therefore at the
equilibrium solution dUdm |sˆ=s < 0 so under FD seller types above θS select
a higher m than under complete information. Equation (3.9) implies that
dU
dm |sˆ=s is decreasing in m from (3.8) so it also follows that increasing m
further from mFD for each S reduces the interim expected profit function
U(sˆ, s,m(sˆ))|sˆ=s. We can immediately prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6.1. In the signalling equilibria of the English auction, if the
secret reserve price is higher than would be announced under Full Disclosure
for every S, then Full Disclosure is preferable to later announcement.32
Proof. Recall from Proposition 3.5.2 that expected profits in EN and WS
are equivalent to that under FD for the same reserve price strategy. Profits
in these mechanisms therefore differ only in the sense that the two auctions
may select a different reserve price strategy, and thus a different m for each
s. We have demonstrated that the interim profit function U(sˆ, s,m(sˆ))|sˆ=s
is decreasing in m for m ≥ mFD. Any secret reserve regime that selects
a higher m than under FD for each s therefore reduces the integrand of
E[Π(EN,WS)] in (3.7) at every s, and results in lower expected profits.
To demonstrate that equilibrium under Full Disclosure (FD) is preferable
to any involving announcement after the auction, it now suffices to verify
that the separating equilibria in the Envelope (EN) and Wait and See (WS)
regimes involve higher reserve prices than under FD. Section 3.7 derives
equilibrium reserve prices in these regimes and verifies this condition.
31Again, see Cai et. al. Equation (8).
32Recall that in equilibrium mR(s) is strictly increasing, and we are presuming that this
always exists. For other cases the proof follows directly by restricting the comparison to
seller types where mR(s) is defined, and noting from Proposition 3.5.1 that FD can do no
worse than EN and WS for the remaining set of seller types.
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3.7 Equilibrium in the EN and WS Regimes
3.7.1 Envelope Regime (EN)
In this section we consider the reserve price setting behaviour of a seller
who selects and commits to a reserve price before bidding commences, but
seals it in an envelope (perhaps to be handed to a committed third party, e.g.
an auctioneer) to be announced after the auction has ended. The interim
expected profit to the seller can be written as follows;
UEN (s, sˆ,m) =
∫ θ
em(m)[βEN (x)−v0(s)]f2(x)dx+[F2(m˜(m))−F1(m)][v(m, sˆ)−v0(s)]
Here βEN (x) is the symmetric equilibrium that describes bidding behaviour
conditional on the equilibrium reserve price strategy that will be selected.
The probability that a bid clears the reserve is summarized by m˜. We shall
write this (with a slight abuse of notation) as m˜(m), since m˜ is a function
of the reserve price that is summarized by m for each s. Again following the
methodology of Riley (1979), we have the following result.
Theorem 3.7.1. There exists a unique separating equilibrium under the
EN regime given by
dmEN
ds
=
dv
ds [F2(m˜(mEN ))− F1(mEN )]
f1(mEN )
[
v(mEN , s)− v0(s)− dvdx |x=mEN
(
F2(em(mEN ))−F1(mEN )
f1(mEN )
)]
with initial condition mEN (θS) = m∗EN (θS) equal to the minimum bidder
type that would be selected under complete information provided
d
dx
[
v(x, s)− dv(x, s)
dx
(F2(m˜(x))− F1(x)
f1(x)
)]
> 0 (3.10)
Proof. See appendix, Section 5.4.
We now show thatmFD(s) < mEN (s), which, recalling Proposition 3.6.1
is sufficient for Full Disclosure to dominate the Envelope regime.
Proposition 3.7.1. The separating equilibrium under Full Disclosure gen-
erates greater expected seller profits than that under the EN regime.
Proof. Given (3.10), m∗EN (θS) = m
∗
FD(θS) since both set
dU
dm = 0 at sˆ =
s = θS in their respective objective functions, and in the envelope auction,
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we know that33
dU
dm
|sˆ=s = f1(m)
[
v0(s)− v(m, s) + dv
dx
|x=m
(F2(m˜(m))− F1(m)
f1(m)
)]
This function only differs from that under FD where F2(m) is replaced by
F2(m˜(m)). We know that m˜ = m for any R at s = θS , so m∗EN (θS) =
m∗FD(θS). For all higher type sellers,
dmEN
ds >
dmFD
ds because we have in-
creased the numerator and decreased the denominator by replacing F2(m)
with F2(m˜(m)), and m˜ < m for S > θS . So mEN ≥ mFD with strict in-
equality for S > θS , and we can apply the logic of Proposition 3.6.1, Full
Disclosure generates greater expected profits than the Envelope auction.
We briefly withhold a discussion in order to demonstrate a very similar
result for the Wait and See (WS) auction.
3.7.2 Wait and See Regime (WS)
In the Wait and See auction the seller selects and announces a reserve
price at the auction’s end. The seller therefore takes the observed bids of all
but the winner as given, and selects a reserve price with the sole intention
of negotiating with the high bidder.34 The interim expected profit is then35
U(s, sˆ,m) =
1− F1(m)
1− F1(β−1(p)) [v(m, sˆ)− v0(s)]
given that the auction ended at price p. Equilibrium is characterized below.
Theorem 3.7.2. There exists a unique separating equilibrium under the
WS regime given by
dmWS
ds
=
dv
ds [1− F1(mWS)]
f1(mWS)
[
v(mWS , s)− v0(s)− dvdx |mWS
(
1−F1(mWS)
f1(mWS)
)]
with initial condition mWS(θS) = m∗WS(θS) sets
dU
dm = 0 at sˆ = s = θS ,
provided
d
dx
[
v(x, s)− dv(x, s)
dx
(1− F1(x)
f1(x)
)]
> 0 (3.11)
33We again refer the reader to the appendix.
34Of course if the selected reserve price is below the second highest bid she will sell at
the auction price.
35The conditional probability in the denominator terms here plays no role as the seller
gains no useful information about the high type from observing all others when signals
are independent, see the proof of Theorem 3.7.2 in the appendix.
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Proof. See appendix, Section 5.5.
Following our previous method, we now prove that FD also dominates
the WS regime.
Proposition 3.7.2. The separating equilibrium under Full Disclosure gen-
erates greater expected seller profits than that under the Wait and See (WS)
regime.
Proof. Given (3.11) holds, in the WS auction we know that36
dU
dm
|sˆ=s = f1(m)1− F1(β−1(p))
[
v0(s)− v(m, sˆ) + dv
dx
|x=m
(1− F1(m)
f1(m)
)]
The only difference between this condition and that under Full Disclosure
is that F2(m) has been replaced by 1 and the whole expression has been
divided by [1 − F1(β−1(p))] ≤ 1. It follows that m∗WS(θ) > m∗FD(θ). Also,
replacing F2(m) with 1 in the dmds equation increases the numerator and
decreases the denominator. Thus dmWSds >
dmFD
ds , so mWS > mFD for all S,
and by Proposition 3.6.1 Full Disclosure is preferable to the Wait and See
regime.
3.8 Secrecy As Delayed Announcement
In the EN and WS regimes bidders treat the reserve price as secret
during the auction. For any given reserve price strategy, m˜ > m for all s,
so players are less likely to clear the reserve than if the same reserve were
announced. However, Proposition 3.5.2 demonstrates that for the same
reserve price strategy, this does not affect expected profits, because sale
will occur more often after the auction to compensate. This means that we
can fix a probability of allocation [1− F1(m)] and analyze the effects of an
increase in the share of profits from the negotiation stage. In the EN and
WS regimes, this shift toward the bargaining component of the mechanism
increases the stakes of selecting the reserve for the seller, and thus increases
her incentive to misrepresent her information. It therefore requires a higher
reserve price to credibly signal the same information. We are moving to
an even more costly signalling mechanism for the seller, since the reserve is
higher than she would like ( dUdm < 0) conditioning on sˆ = s. This decreases
expected profits relative to Full Disclosure.
36Again refer to the appendix.
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The prevalence of secret reserve auctions in practice cannot be explained
as a profit-increasing manipulation of signalling equilibria by the seller. Con-
trary to intuition, the forces of competition cannot be used to diminish the
importance, and thus inefficiency of the signalling mechanism. Rather, in-
formation as reflected through prices is more adequately transmitted earlier,
to be incorporated into the competitive aspects of the mechanism when the
stakes are lower. In our final essay, we test whether the failure of secrecy
in our model can be overturned, and thus a satisfactory explanation for
the pervasiveness of secret reserves uncovered, by restricting the rights and
information of bidders in the negotiation stage.
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Chapter 4
Auctions with an Informed
Seller: Screening
4.1 Signalling vs Screening
4.1.1 The Value of Winning: Information and Rights
In the FD, EN, and WS regimes, and in the theory of English auctions
more generally, the reserve acts as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the high
bidder in the event of non-clearance at auction. The fact that winning
the auction assigns one exclusive rights to post-auction negotiation and any
associated extra information is neither a crucial nor commonly noted feature
of this set up. This phenomenon is common however in real world auctions,
and is protected by law in real estate auctions in NSW, ‘the highest bidder
is the purchaser, subject to any reserve price’.1 It is therefore of interest to
note that, as shown in our second essay, this right is an important feature of
equilibrium under the EN and WS regimes. Recall that the relative failure
of these regimes stems from postponement of the signal announcement; in
equilibrium bidders symmetrically underbid in order to avoid the winner’s
curse and purchase the object when they will know their true valuation. In
some sense, the ability of the winner to learn new information and act on it
in the negotiation stage creates these undesirable outcomes. This motivates
our final essay, in which we consider secret reserve regimes with variations
on the rules of the negotiation game in order to avoid the underbidding
phenomenon. As we shall see, underbidding is not caused by the exclusivity
1Again, see http://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/realestaterenting/buyingselling/buyingatauction.html.
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of rights to negotiation and information that are gained by the winner, but
by the information itself.
The secret reserve regimes we analyze in this essay are characterized
by the fact that given non-clearance, winning the auction involves either
no rights to further information or negotiation, or no such exclusive rights.
These regimes are described as follows.
(RR) Right of Refusal : The seller never announces a reserve, she simply
chooses whether or not to sell the object at the auction price.
(PP) Posted Price: The reserve is selected before the auction, but is ini-
tially kept secret, acting as a posted price in the event of non-clearance.
In this situation the object is won by lottery among the bidders who
are willing to pay the posted price.
After the auction in the RR regime, the seller announces whether or not the
good has been sold, but this is not the same as announcing the reserve price.
Consequently, the role the reserve price plays in EN and WS differs from
that in RR. The reserve is always unknown to bidders in RR: the auction
price acts as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. Winning the auction at
the price p therefore imparts no information that has not already been taken
into account by the bidder. If the seller refuses to sell, then any implications
that may be drawn regarding her information from this action are irrelevant.
If the good is sold, the winning bidder has learnt nothing that she had not
already inferred, and deemed acceptable, from being active at p. Under the
Posted Price regime, in the event of non-clearance the winner does learn new
information upon observing the price, but cannot rely upon being able to
purchase the object whenever she likes after the auction. The fact that the
negotiation game is either trivial, or seemingly unrelated to the auction that
precedes it in these regimes would suggest that similar incentives are at play
in their respective bidding games. The next section demonstrates that this
is not the case. Removing exclusivity cannot resolve the reserve clearance
problem. Rather, the existence of new information itself in the negotiation
stage is the source of the inefficiency. This identifies signalling as the root
cause of inefficiency, and leaves the screening regime RR as the most likely
candidate to overturn the result that disclosure dominates secrecy.
4.1.2 Bidding Under the PP and RR Regimes
In what follows, we retain the model, assumptions and notation from
Chapter 3, and simply expand the choice of reserve regimes. The intuition
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in examining the PP regime is that underbidding may be avoided while
retaining the monopoly pricing aspect of the reserve price offer. This logic
seems promising, since having reached the negotiation stage, a bidder’s prof-
its from the posted price are independent of one’s actions in the auction. It
of course ignores the fact that bidders anticipate the effect of their bidding
behavior on the probability of reaching the lottery. To see how this will influ-
ence equilibrium bids, we again write the expected payoff from announcing
type z given true type x under the candidate equilibrium βR;
E[piPP (z, x)] =
∫ z
θ
∫ esR(y)
θS
[v(x, s)− βR(y)]fS(s)fY (y)dsdy
+ E[piPP (z, x)|win lottery]
As before, the first term captures profits from winning at a price above the
secret reserve. The problem is that the profits from winning the lottery are
in fact affected by one’s behaviour in the auction, since the probability that
the lottery occurs is influenced by one’s bid. In any symmetric equilibrium
a bidder assigns positive probability to being the second highest bidder
(type). A bidder who comes second but clears the reserve receives zero
payoff. However, a slight reduction in her bid, fixing the behaviour of others,
would increase the probability of the reserve not being cleared, and give the
bidder a chance to win the object through the posted price lottery. Since
the PP regime is a secret reserve auction with signalling in the negotiation
stage, we can immediately transplant the intuition from Proposition 3.6.1
to achieve the following.
Observation 4.1.1. The reserve price selected under PP will be higher for
(almost every) s than in the FD regime. By again applying Proposition
3.6.1, FD dominates the PP regime. Therefore it is better to make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the winner in the event of non-clearance than to use a
posted price.2
This result demonstrates that the assignment of winner’s rights in the
secret reserve regimes that involve reserve price offers, for example in real
estate markets, achieves little and may even be detrimental to profits.3 We
2To verify that the seller’s profit function is indeed identical to that in the EN and WS
regimes for a given reserve price strategy, note that expected profits to the seller from the
lottery can be written as [F2(em)−F1(m)][v(m, s)− v0(s)]. The probability of at least one
bidder being willing to pay the posted price is [1− F1(m)].
3We have not considered here a ranking of PP against the EN and WS regimes.
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now return to the RR regime and compare equilibrium expected profits to
those under Full Disclosure.
The only further characterization of an equilibrium that we require here
is that in the RR regime, a seller negotiation strategy is represented by her
reserve price strategy, this is the lowest auction price she will accept. An
equilibrium in RR is defined as a double (R,βRRR ). R is a best response for
the seller given her signal. βRRR is a best response given a bidder’s signal,
the symmetric behaviour of other bidders, and the reserve price strategy R,
which dictates the set of auction prices the seller will accept. It is immediate
that the optimal action of the seller is to accept if and only if the auction
price is at least as high as her valuation v0(s). Thus, in equilibrium under
RR, R(s) = v0(s) will become the de facto reserve. Since we initially wish
to compare bidding behaviour across regimes for a fixed strategy R, we
momentarily withhold from imposing this equilibrium condition, and simply
say that under RR the reserve price R(s) represents the lowest price the
seller will accept. For a general reserve price strategy R, we assume that
withdrawal under RR is irrevocable, since then we do not have to worry
about whether a solution of the equilibrium bidding function is unique.4
In the RR regime a bidder with signal x who announces type z facing
the reserve price strategy R when all other bidders play βR has an expected
payoff given by
E[piRR(z, x)] =
∫ z
θ
∫ esR(y)
θS
[v(x, s)− βR(y)]fS(s)fY (y)dsdy (4.1)
A bidder with signal x is allocated the object when she wins the auction
(Y ≤ z) at a price above the secret reserve R(S) ≤ β(y). Again, the
boundary term s˜R(y) is present because if one wins at a price above the
highest possible reserve, no ‘bad news’ is inferred about the value of S.5 In
equilibrium setting z = x is a best response, and we see from (4.1) that z
only appears in determining the boundary of the integral where Y = z. It is
well known that this leads to truthful ‘break-even’ bidding; a bidder would
receive zero expected surplus in the event of winning in a tie with another
bidder. We now present this formally.
4Irrevocability is only a constraint when bidders learn new information during the
auction that makes it worthwhile to re-enter. In the appendix (proof of Proposition 4.1.1)
we provide a condition on the seller’s valuation such that the assumption of irrevocability
is not required in equilibrium, i.e. when R(s) = v0(s).
5Again, this integral is always positive since we are considering ‘serious’ bidders, soesR(y) = R−1(min{βR(y), R(θS)}) > θS .
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Proposition 4.1.1. Given the reserve price strategy R in the Right of Re-
fusal (RR) regime, the symmetric equilibrium bidding function is given by
βRRR (x) :=
{
b = w(x,R−1(b)) if R(θS) ≥ ES [v(x, S)]
ES [v(x, S)] if R(θS) ≤ ES [v(x, S)] (4.2)
Proof. See the appendix, Section 5.6.
Bids are equal to the expected value conditional on clearing the se-
cret reserve. This is similar to the derivation of equilibrium in the second
price sealed bid auction with interdependent values in Milgrom and Weber
(1982a). In our case, the signals are independently distributed and the in-
terdependence of valuations is limited: a bidder’s valuation depends on the
seller’s signal but not on the signals of other bidders. This introduces asym-
metry between the bidder and seller strategies and valuation functions, so
that the winner’s curse information cannot be summarized solely by mono-
tonicity in types. As in Chapter 3 we allow the possibility that some high
types of bidder (x : R(θS) ≤ ES [v(x, S)]) always clear the reserve. These
types bid their unconditional expected value because no bad news is im-
plied from winning. In the Right of Refusal regime the negotiation stage is
trivial in the sense that no new information is revealed; the allocation rule
is determined completely by the set of bids. The only way to win the ob-
ject is through sale at the auction price, which occurs whenever the reserve
is cleared during the bidding game. If we ignore the issue of equilibrium
reserve price selection, we can apply a Corollary of Proposition 3.5.1;
Proposition 4.1.2. For a fixed reserve price strategy R, allocation occurs
more often in the FD regime than under RR, and FD dominates RR.
Proof. The result follows from our proof of Proposition 3.5.1 (Lemma 5.2.1)
and noting that in the RR regime, there is no distinction between reserve
clearance and allocation, because the reserve represents the lowest price the
seller will accept. Since negotiation under FD represents another opportu-
nity to sell the good, allocation must occur more often under FD than in
the RR regime.
The importance of the probability of reserve clearance to this argument
can be seen using a slight variation of Example 3.4.3. Fixing distributions,
valuation functions and the reserve price strategy from that example, we can
compare the seller’s expected profits from the bidding game in the FD and
RR regimes; from Proposition 3.5.1 (ii), if these profits are greater under
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FD, total profits from the mechanism are as well. For the RR regime, the
equilibrium bid is b = w(x,R−1(b)), where
w(x,R−1(b)) = x+ E[S|S ≤ 2
3
b] (4.3)
So βRRR (x) =
3
2x.
6 A bidder clears the reserve in this case whenever 32s ≤ 32x
or s ≤ x. The auction price is the point at which the second last bidder
withdraws (the second highest bid) and calling f2(x) the density of the
second highest bidder type, we can express the seller’s expected profit under
RR as
ΠRR =
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
(
3
2
x− 3
2
s)f(s)f2(x)dsdx
=
3
2
∫ 1
0
(x2 − x
2
2
)f2(x)dx
=
3
4
∫ 1
0
x2f2(x)dx
For FD, bidders bid their values; bˆ = x+ s. The reserve is therefore cleared
whenever x ≥ s2 . We use these facts to separate the expected profits from
the bidding game as follows;
ΠFD(Bidding Game) = ΠFD(
s
2
≤ x ≤ s,Bidding Game)+ΠFD(x ≥ s,Bidding Game)
(4.4)
Concentrating on the second term in (4.4), we have
ΠFD(x ≥ s,Bidding Game) =
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
(x+ s− 3
2
s)f2(x)f(s)dsdx
=
∫ 1
0
[x2 − 1
4
x2]f2(x)dx
=
3
4
∫ 1
0
x2f2(x)dx
= ΠRR
6An almost identical calculation is given in the original example. Note that by con-
struction of this example all but the highest type of bidder experience ‘bad news’, since
meeting the reserve implies S = x, which is a positive probability event for all but the
highest type of bidder. Recall from the equilibrium bidding function (4.2) that this is by
no means a general feature.
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So (4.4) becomes
ΠFD(Bidding Game) = ΠFD(
s
2
≤ x ≤ s,Bidding Game) +ΠRR
Note that bids can be higher in either regime depending on the value of S.
Again using the example s = 0 bids are higher under RR since 32x ≥ x,
while for s = 1 valuations exceed expected valuations. Regardless, we have
found that expected profits from the bidding game, and, therefore, in the
regime itself are higher under FD because the reserve is cleared more often.
Bids incorporate a conditional expectation over S when it is unknown. If we
integrate over all outcomes in which this expectation is correct, i.e. when
the secret reserve is cleared (x ≥ s), we achieve the expected value of the
second highest valuation in that range. The same expected profits would
be achieved for signals in this region if bidders knew S, since then bids are
equivalent to valuations. So the profit ranking follows from the fact that the
good is allocated more often under FD, as a result of the avoidance of the
winner’s curse under RR.
Once we consider equilibrium reserve price selection, this result need not
hold. It is clear that the strongest form of a secret reserve, one that is never
announced as in the RR regime can avoid the undesirable characteristics of
signalling equilibria. Further, this screening regime most closely resembles
those run by auction houses as described by Ashenfelter (1989), recall; ‘Only
after the auction does the auctioneer reveal whether and at what price the
item may have actually been sold. In short, the auctioneers do not reveal the
reserve price and make it as difficult as they can for bidders to infer it ’. The
seller’s equilibrium reserve price will be much lower than under signalling;
she has a dominant strategy to accept any price above her reservation value.
She therefore faces a tradeoff between perhaps allocating more often, thus
avoiding the inefficiencies of signalling equilibria, but losing monopoly price
setting power. In the next section we show that if uncertainty about re-
serve prices (in equilibrium, the seller’s reservation value) predominantly
reflects uncertainty about the ‘bidder relevant’ component of the seller’s in-
formation, then the Right of Refusal dominates Full Disclosure. We can
therefore explain the prevalence of secret reserves as used by auction houses
as a response to the seller’s inability to cheaply and/or credibly reveal her
private information. Further, this conclusion is arguably of some interest to
the more general issue of asset pricing under asymmetric information that
was foreshadowed by Akerlof (1970), and Maskin and Tirole (1992)’s discus-
sion regarding the relative difficulties of implementation via signalling and
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screening by an informed principal under ‘common’ values.7
4.2 The Right of Refusal
We have shown that a seller who will eventually announce a reserve price
should do so earlier to signal the same information in a less costly manner.
The possibility remains however that Full Disclosure may be dominated by
a policy of full secrecy. That is, it may be optimal to never reveal the reserve
price and instead operate under the Right of Refusal (RR). There is reason
to be optimistic about such a policy, since if the seller never reveals her
information, bidders are never concerned about the seller’s incentives and
costly increases in the reserve price above the complete information case may
be avoided. The cost of such a policy is that the seller must sacrifice potential
profits by refusing sale when there is a possibility that the winner would be
willing to pay a higher price if she knew the value of S. To investigate
this, recall the equilibrium bidding function under RR from (4.2) and call
m˜RR(s) the threshold value for reserve clearance in the equilibrium of the
RR regime. Assume that m˜RR(s) < θ, so ∀s ∃x : w(x, s) ≥ v0(s). The
interim expected profits to the seller in this regime are
U˜(s, m˜RR(s)) =
∫ θ
emRR(s)[βRR(x)− v0(s)]f2(x)dx
Recall that in equilibrium under FD we had
U(sˆ, s,mFD(sˆ))|sˆ=s =
∫ θ
mFD(s)
[v(x, s)− v0(s)]f2(x)dx
+[F2(mFD(s))− F1(mFD(s))][v(mFD(s), s)− v0(s)]
In the equilibrium of FD we considered, the seller’s interim expected profit
at her lowest signal value is equivalent to that which she would earn under
complete information. Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) show that this is described
by8
mFD(θS) =

θ if J(θ, θS) ≥ v0(θS)
J−1s (v0(θS)) if J(θ, θS) ≤ v0(θS) ≤ J(θ, θS)
θ if J(θ, θS) ≤ v0(θS)
7Recall our treatment of Maskin and Tirole’s work in Chapter 1.
8See their Equation (7).
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where
J(x, s) = v(x, s)− dv
dx
(F2(x)− F1(x)
f1(x)
)
(4.5)
J−1s (.) is the inverse of J for fixed S = s. J(x, s) is the generalization of
the virtual valuation concept from Myerson (1981), and recall from (3.9)
that we have assumed J(x, s) is strictly increasing, which corresponds to
Myerson’s regular case.9 To achieve a profit ranking for FD and RR, it is
helpful to know how interim profits change with S in these regimes. For the
RR regime, we have
d
ds
[U˜(s, m˜RR(s))] = −[β(mRR(s))− v0(s)]f2(m˜RR(s))dm˜
RR(s)
ds
− v′0(s)[1− F2(m˜RR(s))]
= −[1− F2(m˜RR(s))]v′0(s) < 0 (4.6)
In the first line, the expression in the square brackets becomes 0 because
either β(mRR(s)) = v0(s) (if ∃x : βRR(x) = R(s)) or dm
RR(s)
ds = 0 (if
βRR(θ) > v0(s)). The seller receives lower expected profits as her signal
increases because her reservation value increases, but bids do not as they
are independent of S. Her highest interim profits are therefore achieved at
her lowest signal value, where she benefits from the externality that occurs
due to the existence of higher possible types of herself.
Performing the same operation for interim profit in the FD regime achieves
d
ds
[U(sˆ, s,mFD(sˆ))|sˆ=s] = dUdsˆ |sˆ=s +
( dU
dmFD(sˆ)
)
|sˆ=s
(dmFD(sˆ)
dsˆ
)
|sˆ=s +
(dU
ds
)
= −v′0(s)[1− F2(mFD(s)) + F2(mFD(s))− F1(mFD(s))]
− [1− F1(mFD(s))]v′0(s)
= −[1− F1(mFD(s))]v′0(s) < 0 (4.7)
By a standard envelope theorem argument, infinitesimal changes in the
seller’s type only influence her utility through their direct effect on her ob-
jective function in equilibrium. At s = θ, the seller allocates as she would
under complete information, and her interim profits fall as S increases, de-
spite the fact that valuations, and thus bids increase. It is as if she keeps
selling the good in the same circumstances, and forfeits a greater cost, the
increase given by v′0(s). All revenue benefits accrued from higher bidder
9To achieve his pure private values model, set v(x, s) = x in J(x, s), and note that
F2(x)−F1(x)
f1(x)
= 1−F (x)f(x) under independence.
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valuations must be ‘paid for’ with suboptimal monopoly pricing in order for
the information to be transmitted credibly. Using (4.7) and (4.6) with the
Fundamental Theorem of Calculus we can find new expressions for ex ante
expected profits. For the RR regime;
U˜(s, m˜RR(s)) = U˜(θS , m˜
RR(θS))−
∫ s
θS
[1− F2(m˜RR(t)))]v′0(t)dt
Taking expectations over S and rearranging the integrals achieves the fol-
lowing;
ES [U˜(s, m˜RR(s))] = U˜(θS , m˜
RR(θS))
−
∫ θS
θS
[1− FS(s)][1− F2(m˜RR(s))]v′0(s)ds
(4.8)
Similarly for the FD regime;
ES [U(s, sˆ,mFD(sˆ))|sˆ=s] = U(θS , sˆ,m
FD(sˆ))|sˆ=θS
−
∫ θS
θS
[1− FS(s)][1− F1(mFD(s))]v′0(s)ds
(4.9)
Using these expressions, the following theorem presents sufficient conditions
for the RR regime to dominate Full Disclosure.
Proposition 4.2.1. If m˜RR(s) < θ ∀s and at s = θS expected profits
under RR exceed that under FD by at least ES [v0(s)] − v0(θS) then RR ex
ante dominates FD.
Proof. If m˜RR(s) < θ ∀s then ex ante expected profits in RR and FD can
be computed using (4.8) and (4.9). RR auction dominates FD iff
U˜(θS , m˜RR(θS))− U(θS , sˆ,mFD(sˆ))|sˆ=θS
>
∫ θS
θS
{
[1− FS(s)][F1(mFD(s))− F2(m˜RR(s))]v′0(s)
}
ds
Since [F1(mFD(s)) − F2(m˜RR(s))] < 1 ∀s, and the other terms in the
integrand are non-negative, the following is sufficient;
U˜(θS , m˜
RR(θS))− U(θS , sˆ,mFD(sˆ))|sˆ=θS ≥
∫ θS
θS
[1− FS(s)]v′0(s)ds
= ES [v0(s)]− v0(θS) (4.10)
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This condition is particularly convenient since we do not need to compute
anything that depends upon the complicated signalling equilibrium under
FD. The inequality can be directly computed from the valuation and dis-
tribution functions of the bidders and the seller, and (similarly) the seller’s
optimal reserve when her type is known s = θS . Intuitively, the condition
compares the costs and benefits of screening relative to signalling. The LHS
reflects the benefit of selling at average information prices despite holding
poor information, relative to monopoly profits. The right hand side reflects
the fact that when S is high and the good is sold under RR the seller is
paid the same as she would be under FD, she misses out on the increase
in the fair compensation ES [v0(s)]. We now revisit our earlier example to
glean further insight as to the conditions under which (4.10) holds and RR
dominates FD.
4.2.1 Linear Valuations: RR Dominates FD
Say that there are two bidders, with bidder valuations and signal dis-
tributions fixed as per the example in Section 3.4.3, so x ∼ U [0, 1] and
v = x + s. Let the seller’s valuation be γs : γ > 0, and say that S is
distributed uniformly on [0,ω]. We are therefore allowing flexibility in the
type of uncertainty that bidders face when S is unknown; that regarding
the reserve price, or seller’s valuation, and the information of interest that
determines the reserve price. The threshold value under FD at s = 0 can be
computed by solving for mFD(0) from (4.5), which gives m(0) = 12 . Given
the bidders’ valuation structure, at s = 0 the model under FD conveniently
collapses to the private values case. The expected profits under FD are like-
wise the same, equal to 512 .
10 Now we compute expected profits under RR.
Using the bidding function from (4.2) we have11
βRR(x) :=
{
γ
γ− 12
x if x ≤ ω(γ − 12)
x+ ω2 if x ≥ ω(γ − 12)
At s = 0, the seller’s valuation is zero and the good is always allocated. If
γ ≤ 12 , then ω(γ− 12) ≤ 0 and all types of bidder will bid their unconditional
expected value. Cases in which all types bid their unconditional expected
value may appear to be of little practical interest, since this implies that
10Note this is true for any γ, and the reserve and bids are independent of the seller’s
distribution, meaning this result is also independent of ω.
11It is simple to verify in this instance that the condition emRR(s) < θ ∀s is satisfied.
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the secret reserve under RR will always be cleared, a restriction that pre-
sumably does not hold in most applications. Nevertheless, it can be verified
that for γ ≤ 12 ,ω ≥ 13 RR dominates FD, which shows that a seller with
private information should not attempt any monopoly pricing if gains from
trade are ‘significant’ despite the fact that this would be desirable under
complete information (since m∗(s) ≥ 12).12 In this case the RR reserve is
equivalent to not having a reserve at all, so this feature corresponds to a
well known result in signalling games; banning the signalling activity can
generate Pareto improvements.13 A more interesting case is where RR dom-
inates FD and the reserve is not always cleared. To analyze such cases,
consider ω(γ − 12) ∈ (0, 1). Some bidders (types below ω(γ − 12)) know they
will not clear the reserve in some realizations and so bid their conditional
expectations. Expected profits to the seller at s = 0 under RR are
U˜(0, m˜RR(0)) =
∫ ω(γ− 12 )
0
γ
γ − 12
xf2(x)dx+
∫ 1
ω(γ− 12 )
(x+
ω
2
)f2(x)dx
=
∫ 1
0
xf2(x)dx+
1
2
γ − 12
∫ ω(γ− 12 )
0
xf2(x)dx+
ω
2
[1− F2(ω(γ − 12))]
=
1
3
+
ω
2
+
1
(γ − 12)
[
x2
2
− x
3
3
]ω(γ−
1
2 )
0 −
ω
2
[2ω(γ − 1
2
)− ω2(γ − 1
2
)2]
=
1
3
+
ω
2
+
ω3(γ − 12)2
6
− ω
2(γ − 12)
2
Again using (4.10) RR dominates FD if
2ω3(γ − 1
2
)2 − 6ω2(γ − 1
2
)− 6ω(γ − 1
2
) + 3ω − 1 ≥ 0 (4.11)
So taking (for example) the parameters γ = 58 and ω = 2, the above holds.
14
Holding ω constant and differentiating the left hand side of (4.11), we find
that this expression is strictly decreasing in (γ− 12) whenever ω(γ− 12) ∈ [0, 1].
Thus the likelihood of RR dominating FD (in terms of our condition) is
decreasing in the seller’s signal weighting above 12 . This reflects the fact that
reducing γ increases gains from trade, lessening the ‘bad news’ implied from
clearing the secret reserve, since ES [S ≤ bγ ] is decreasing in γ. Decreasing γ
12An example would be the state designing their selling procedure for future privati-
zations. Arguably it is known that there are will be significant gains from trade in all
realizations and the government will be committed to selling the asset.
13See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) Section 13C.
14Given these parameters the condition ω(γ − 12 ) = 14 ∈ [0, 1] is also satisfied.
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also increases the set of bidders who bid their unconditional expected value,
pushing us toward the result for γ < 12 above. Alternatively, fixing the
spread of information that is relevant to bidders (given by ω), increasing
γ means that clearing a secret reserve price conveys more bad information
under RR, and signalling becomes easier to implement under FD since the
increase in the seller’s reservation value is greater for each realization of
her signal. Finally, note that the degree of bidders’ uncertainty regarding
a secret reserve is increasing in both γ and ω, since higher values of either
of these parameters increase the ‘spread’ of possible reserves the bidder
could be facing. Despite the simple linear structure of this example, we
can nevertheless uncover an interesting link between the source of bidders’
uncertainty and the dominance of RR. To analyze this, first re-express (4.11)
as
ω(2c2 − 6c+ 3)− 6c− 1 ≥ 0 (4.12)
where c = ω(γ − 12). We are fixing a bidder’s level of total uncertainty c
which dictates whether or not she views herself as competing against the
seller, i.e. whether or not her bid may fail to meet the reserve. Now say
that (2c2 − 6c + 3) ≥ 0, which must be the case for RR to dominate FD
under our condition.15 Then the LHS of (4.12) is increasing in ω. Since
we must reduce γ if we are to increase ω keeping c fixed, the dominance
of RR must increase in the seller’s information share of uncertainty. The
seller’s decision regarding a secret reserve is therefore more subtle than the
range of possible secret reserve prices that bidders may face. Fixing the
spread of private seller information, stronger seller preferences (higher γ)
makes disclosure more likely to be selected, since the seller’s reservation value
increases making reserve price announcements more credible. If however
a given spread of reserve prices reflects significant underlying uncertainty
about the seller’s information itself, then RR becomes preferable. Thus if
the seller’s valuation is sufficiently relevant to the market, RR dominates
FD.
4.3 Conclusion
We have investigated the properties of secret reserve regimes in a setting
in which the seller holds private information about the quality of the object.
Somewhat surprisingly, we have found that later announcement of a reserve
15This is equivalent to c ≤ 12 (3−
√
3) ≈ 0.63
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exacerbates the seller’s incentive problem, so that Full Disclosure is prefer-
able to later announcement of a reserve. (Almost) every type of seller will
therefore select a higher reserve price under secrecy, so FD is preferable to
EN and WS. The undesirable characteristics of the signalling equilibria can
be avoided if the seller uses the Right of Refusal, provided the variability of
reserve prices stems primarily from the variability of the underlying informa-
tion that is relevant to bidders. We believe this conclusion to be particularly
important for the design of institutions in which the seller’s role is purely
that of a trader, in which case all information contained in her reservation
value is relevant to the market. The most obvious example of such a third
party seller is an auction house, in which the value of withholding supply
reflects the discounted value of revenue from future sales. This interpreta-
tion can be easily accommodated in our model by presuming that the game
(including regime selection) is repeated in the event of non-clearance with a
new set of bidders.16 Our model therefore provides an explanation for the
observations of Ashenfelter (1989) regarding the prevalence of secret reserves
in these institutions. However, the conclusion that secrecy is best may also
hold more broadly in markets for financial assets (e.g. privatization, mergers
and acquisitions) in which asymmetric information is a powerful force and
private perceptions of value are universally relevant.
16Note the contrast with Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) which requires the same set
of bidders in each round so that the information gleaned from the initial auction can
influence revenues in future auctions.
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Chapter 5
Appendices
5.1 Construction of Payment Functions
Given a generic allocation rule, for each i '= 0 construct the following
payment rule;
Mi(x) = θiqi(θi) +
∫ xi
θi
tiq
′
i(ti)dti
+
1
N
∫ x0
θ0
t0q
′
0(t0)dt0 −
1
N
∫ θ0
θ0
t0(1− F0(t0))q′0(t0)dt0
Taking expectations, the terms in the second line are differenced away to
achieve the following expression for mi(xi)
mi(xi) = θiqi(θi) +
∫ xi
θi
tiq
′
i(ti)dti
By construction, Ui(θi) = θiqi(θi)− θiqi(θi) = 0. Incentive compatibility for
each buyer follows the demonstration in Myerson (1981) (Theorem 1). For
the seller, the expected receipts are
m0(x0)−m0(z0) =
N∑
i=1
1
N
∫ x0
θ0
t0q
′
0(t0)dt0 −
N∑
i=1
1
N
∫ θ0
θ0
t0(1− F0(t0))q′0(t0)dt0
=
∫ x0
z0
t0q
′
0(t0)dt0
In the first line, the terms inMi(x) that are independent of x0 are differenced
away. The second line follows because the terms that remain are independent
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of i. From this point, the proof of IC for the seller is analogous to that for
the buyers.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1.
Proof. Differentiating (3.3) with respect to z yields1
dE[Π(z, x)]
dz
=
∫ es(z)
θS
[v(x, s)− β(z)]fS(s)fY (z)ds+
∫ max{s(x),es(z)}
es(z) [v(x, s)−R(s)]fS(s)fY (z)ds
(5.1)
by Liebniz’ rule. Setting z = x, it is simple to verify that β(x) = v(mR(θS), θS)
= R(θS) sets the first order condition equal to 0 for x = mR(θS). Thus
βR(mR(θS)) = R(θS), and the lowest participating bidder under secrecy is
type mR(θS), as it is under disclosure. We can also conclude that sR(x) is
defined for all participating bidders, because it is the inverse of mR and is
defined for x ≥ mR(θS). This proves the first part of the proposition. To
derive the equilibrium bidding function, replace β(z) with b and z with x in
(5.1), then solve
FS(R−1(min{b, R(θS)}))b =
∫ R−1(min{b,R(θS)})
θS
v(x, s)fS(s)ds
+
∫ max{s(x),R−1(min{b,R(θS)})}
R−1(min{b,R(θS)})
[v(x, s)−R(s)]fS(s)ds
(5.2)
in b. Is there a solution to this equation for b ≥ R(θS)? Substituting
b ≥ R(θS) into (5.2) yields b = ES [v(x, S)]. It follows that bidder types for
whom the unconditional expected value exceed the highest possible reserve
price should bid this value. This is consistent with the implementation of
Bayes’ Rule (and avoidance of the winner’s curse), since if bidding in such
a fashion always causes one to clear the reserve, no ‘bad news’ should be
inferred about the value of S. We now address the remaining case where
x ≥ mR(θS) and ES [v(x, S)] < R(θS). To do this, we need the following
Lemma.
1We suppress the subscript R where possible in the algebra here for notational conve-
nience.
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Lemma 5.2.1. For any strictly increasing R and mR, sR(x) ≥ s˜R(x) for
x ≥ mR(θS), with strict equality for x > mR(θS). Equivalently, ∀s m˜R(s) ≥
mR(s) with strict equality for s > θS.
Proof. Say that the proposition is false, so that for some x there is a solution
to (5.2) in b for R(θS) ≤ b ≤ R(θS), and s˜R(x) > sR(x). Then β(x) =
w(x, s˜R(x)), because the ‘option’ component of the bid becomes zero. The
option will never be exercised since β(x) < R(s) implies v(x, s) < R(s). Now
given s we can write the bid at x = m˜(s) as β(m˜(s)) = w(m˜(s), s˜(m˜(s))).
But
R(s) = β(m˜(s)) = w(m˜(s), s˜(m˜(s)))
= w(m˜(s), s)
≤ v(m˜(s), s) (5.3)
So type m˜(s) is still active when S is known. m(s) is strictly increasing by
assumption, and m˜(s) is strictly increasing because βR(x) is independent of
s and R′ > 0. It follows that m(s) ≤ m˜(s), with the equality coming from
the event in (5.3) where s = θS . Similarly, s(x) ≥ s˜(x) for x ≥ m(θS).
Given this result, we can substitute sR(x) ≥ R−1(b) for b ≤ R(θS) into
(5.2). This yields
FS(R−1(b))b =
∫ R−1(b)
θS
v(x, s)fS(s)ds+
∫ s(x)
R−1(b)
[v(x, s)−R(s)]fS(s)ds
≡ F(b) (5.4)
We now prove that there is a unique solution to this equation for x :
ES [v(x, s)] ≤ R(θS), x ≥ mR(θS), which will complete the proof. Dif-
ferentiating the right hand side of this expression with respect to b, we have
F ′(b) = v(x,R−1(b))fS(R−1(b))dR
−1(b)
db
− [v(x,R−1(b))− b]fS(R−1(b))dR
−1(b)
db
= fS(R−1(b))
dR−1(b)
db
b > 0
because fS , R′ and b > 0. Alternatively differentiating FS(R−1(b))b gives
d
db
[FS(R−1(b))b] = fS(R−1(b))
dR−1(b)
db
b+ FS(R−1(b))
= F ′(b) + FS(R−1(b))
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So the LHS term of (5.4) starts below F(b), but increases in b at a greater
rate than the RHS. We have already shown that the lowest bid from a
participating bidder is R(θS). It follows that for x > mR(θS), at b = R(θS)
the LHS of (5.4) is zero, while the RHS is positive. Then we only need
find some b ∈ [R(θS), R(s(x))], such that F (R−1(b))b ≥ F(b) to ensure
the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (5.4). Taking b = R(s(x)) =
v(x, s(x)), the LHS term is FS(s(x))v(x, s(x)). Evaluating F(b) at the same
point gives
F(v(x, s(x))) =
∫ s(x)
θS
v(x, s)fS(s)ds < FS(s(x))v(x, s(x))
Then at b = v(x, s(x)) we have FS(R−1(b))b > F(b), so continuously in-
creasing b from R(θS) achieves a solution to (5.2) by the Intermediate Value
Theorem. This completes the proof.
5.3 Bidding Function: Discussion
Note that the bidding function for ES [v(x, s)] ≤ R(θS) can also be ex-
pressed as
β(x) = w(x,R−1(β(x)))+
∫ s(x)
R−1(β(x))[v(x, s)−R(s)]fS(s)ds
FS(s(x))− F (R−1(β(x))) ×
FS(s(x))− FS(R−1(β(x)))
FS(R−1(β(x)))
the second term is the expected surplus from receiving a reserve price offer
weighted by the probability of this event relative to winning at the auc-
tion price. Again, we have proven in Lemma 5.2.1 that such an offer yields
positive expected surplus for all types of bidder who bid below their uncon-
ditional expected value. On the other hand, the expected value in the first
term w(x,R−1(β(x))) effectively has a weight of 1. These weights sum to
FS(s(x))
FS(R−1(β(x)))
> 1
The fact that the equilibrium bid is not (indeed it exceeds) a convex combi-
nation of expected values seems to suggest players are overbidding. In fact,
this is not so; bidders can afford to do this because when they win and the
reserve is not cleared, their bid becomes irrelevant and they have made no
commitment.2 They can decide later whether or not to buy at a price the
seller will decide.
2Recall that in this event their bid remains unobserved.
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A general feature of the English auction (and also Second Price Sealed
Bid auction) is that players bid such that the expected value from ‘just’
winning (i.e. when there is a tie with another bidder) equals their expected
payment in this outcome.3 Since bidders are price takers, all they can do is
make sure that they participate in all trades that yield non-negative expected
profit, so the marginal trade (when the object is won in a tie with another
bidder) results in an expected net payoff of zero. Equation (5.5) also exhibits
this ‘break even’ characteristic; expected payments at the marginal trade
equal the expected gross payoff given a tie. The only distinction is in the
definition of the marginal trade. The expected value of winning from a tie
is equivalent to the Right Hand Side of (5.5) and includes both winning at
the auction price and from a reserve price offer. However, the Left Hand
Side differs slightly, because the marginal trade is defined by winning at the
auction price only, since this is the only instance where one’s bid in the
auction determines whether trade occurs. If the reserve is not cleared trade
is determined by the bidder’s acceptance or rejection of the reserve price
offer, which is independent of her bid in the auction. A bidder therefore
sets the expected payment from the marginal trade (i.e. when the second
highest bid is equal to her own and above the reserve) equal to the gross
expected payoffs from winning in a tie, which can occur at the auction price
or some offer above.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 3.7.1.
Proof. Take the first order conditions of UEN (s, sˆ,m(sˆ)) with respect to sˆ
and m;
dU
dsˆ
= [F2(m˜(m))− F1(m)]dv
dsˆ
dU
dm
= f2(m˜(m))
dm˜(m)
dm
[v(m, sˆ)− β(m˜(m))]
− f1(m)[v(m, sˆ)− v0(s)] + [F2(m˜(m))− F1(m)]dv
dx
|x=m
Following Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) (Theorem 1), we can verify that the
single crossing condition holds, namely that dds
(
dU/dm
dU/dsˆ
)
> 0, because dUdsˆ
is not a function of s and dUdm is increasing in s. Recall that a separating
3See for example Krishna (2002) Section 8.2; Second Price Auctions with Interdepen-
dent Values.
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equilibrium constitutes a minimum bidder type m(s) such that dmds > 0,
and sˆ = s maximizes UEN (s, sˆ,m(sˆ)). Setting sˆ = s in the First Order
Conditions yields
dU
dsˆ
= [F2(m˜(m))− F1(m)]dv
dsˆ
|sˆ=s
dU
dm
= − f1(m)[v(m, s)− v0(s)] + [F2(m˜(m))− F1(m)]dv
dx
|x=m
= f1(m)
[
v0(s)− v(m, s) + dv
dx
|x=m
(F2(m˜(m))− F1(m)
f1(m)
)]
The first term in the original expression for dUdm disappears because either
β(m˜(m)) = v(m, s) = R(s) or β(m˜(m)) < R(s) = v(m, s) so dem(m)dm = 0.
Thus by Theorem 1 of Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007), (3.10) is sufficient for the
existence of a unique separating equilibrium given by
dmEN
ds
= −
dUEN
dsˆ |sˆ=s
dUEN
dmEN
|sˆ=s
=
dv
ds [F2(m˜(mEN ))− F1(mEN )]
f1(mEN )
[
v(mEN , s)− v0(s)− dvdx |x=mEN
(
F2(em(mEN ))−F1(mEN )
f1(mEN )
)]
with initial condition mEN (θS) = m∗EN (θS).
5.5 Proof of Theorem 3.7.2.
Proof. We have the following first order conditions for UWS(sˆ, s,m(sˆ));
dU
dsˆ
=
1− F1(m)
1− F1(β−1(p))
(dv
dsˆ
)
dU
dm
=
1
1− F1(β−1(p))
[
− f1(m)[v(m, sˆ)− v0(s)] + [1− F1(m)]dv
dx
|x=m
]
Again, dUdsˆ is independent of s and
dU
dm is increasing in m, so the single
crossing condition holds, and at sˆ = s we have
dU
dsˆ
=
1− F1(m)
1− F1(β−1(p))
(dv
dsˆ |sˆ=s
)
dU
dm
=
f1(m)
1− F1(β−1(p))
[
v0(s)− v(m, sˆ) + dv
dx |x=m
(1− F1(m)
f1(m)
)]
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Thus by Theorem 1 of Cai et. al., (3.11) is sufficient for the existence of a
unique separating equilibrium given by
dmWS
ds
= −
dUWS
dsˆ |sˆ=s
dUWS
dmWS
|sˆ=s
=
dv
ds [1− F1(mWS)]
f1(mWS)
[
v(mWS , s)− v0(s)− dvdx |x=mWS
(
1−F1(mWS)
f1(mWS)
)]
with initial condition mWS(θS) = m∗WS(θS).
5.6 Proof of Proposition 4.1.1.
Proof. Differentiating (4.1) with respect to z yields the first order condition[ ∫ es(z)
θS
v(x, s)f(s)ds− β(z)FS(s˜(z))
]
fY (z) = 0
Setting z = x and rearranging for the symmetric equilibrium βRR, we have
βRRR (x) := w(x, s˜(x)) =
{
b = w(x,R−1(b)) if R(θS) ≥ ES [v(x, S)]
ES [v(x, S)] if R(θS) ≤ ES [v(x, S)]
If ES [v(x, s)] ≥ R(θS), we have βRRR (x) = ES [v(x, s)]. Mimicking our ar-
guments from Proposition 3.4.1, at x = mR(θS) we have β(mR(θS)) =
v(mR(θS)) = R(θS), and the lowest type of participating bidder is the same
under RR and for known S for a given reserve price strategy. Further, we
have shown that a solution to (5.5) must exist in our proof of Lemma 5.2.1.
We now prove that if R(s) (and in equilibrium v0(s)) is not too concave,
in a sense that will be specified, then any solution to (5.5) below R(θS)
is unique. Under this condition, our assumption of irrevocable exit is not
required in equilibrium. Suppose the solution to (5.5) is not unique, so that
that there are multiple solutions to b = w(x,R−1(b)), and call the first p∗.
Clearly these other solutions must occur in (p∗, R(sR(x))), since any solution
at or above R(sR(x)) would involve w(x,R−1(b)) ≥ v(x,R−1(b)), which is
impossible for R−1(b) > θS . Further, note that one solution alone cannot
exist in this range, at least two must. The reason is that the expected
value function w must drop back below b before b = R(sR(x)), so that
w(x, sR(x)) < v(x, sR(x)). Call the first two of these (possibly many) extra
solutions p1 and p2, with p∗ < p1 < p2 < R(sR(x)). Since p∗ and p1
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both lie on the line b = w(x,R−1(b)), the slope between them is one. This
immediately implies the existence of at least one point p′ ∈ [p∗, p1] such that
d
db
w(x,R−1(b))|b=p′ = 1
by the Mean Value Theorem. By a similar argument another point p′′ ∈
[p2, R(sR(x))] must exist such that
d
db
w(x,R−1(b))b=p′′ = 1
We can write the derivative ddbw(x,R
−1(b)) explicitly as
d
db
w(x,R−1(b)) =
1
R′(s)|s=R−1(b)
fS(R−1(b))
FS(R−1(b))
[v(x,R−1(b))− w(x,R−1(b))]
Since p1 and p2 are the smallest solutions above p∗, the definitions of p′ and
p′′ imply that
p′ > w(x,R−1(p′))
p′′ < w(x,R−1(p′′))
or
v(x,R−1(p′))− w(x,R−1(p′)) > v(x,R−1(p′))− p′
v(x,R−1(p′′))− w(x,R−1(p′′)) < v(x,R−1(p′′))− p′′
From the definition of ddbw(x,R
−1(b)), and substituting in its value of 1 at
p′ and p′′, we have
v(x,R−1(p′))− p′ < R′(s)|s=R−1(p′)FS(R
−1(p′))
fS(R−1(p′))
v(x,R−1(p′′))− p′′ > R′(s)|s=R−1(p′′)FS(R
−1(p′′))
fS(R−1(p′′))
We know that [v(x,R−1(b))−b] falls with b, because dvds < R′(s) is necessary
for mR(s) to be increasing. So the above implies
R′(s)|s=R−1(p′)FS(R
−1(p′))
fS(R−1(p′))
> R′(s)|s=R−1(p′′)FS(R
−1(p′′))
fS(R−1(p′′))
(5.5)
Calling FSfS = σ, the function R
′(s)|s=R−1(b)σ(R−1(b)) is non-decreasing in b
provided
R′′ ≥ −σ
′
σ
R′ ∀s (5.6)
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By regularity, −σ′σ R′ < 0, so (5.6) is equivalent to the statement that the
reserve price strategy R is not too concave. Under (5.6), the fact that
p′′ > p′ by definition gives us a contradiction in (5.5). Thus any solution to
(5.5) is unique. In the equilibrium of the RR regime, we can replace R(s)
with v0(s), and (5.6) reduces to a condition on the seller’s valuation and
distribution functions. In general, we will only consider the first solution to
(5.5), and rely on the assumption of irrevocable exit so that other solutions
are irrelevant.
So for R(θS) ≥ w(x, θS) = ES [v(x, S)] we have a solution to b =
w(x,R−1(b)) by the Intermediate Value Theorem.If on the other hand the
unconditional expected value exceeds the highest possible seller value, then
we have b = ES [v(x, S)]. Bidding the unconditional expected value ensures
that a bidder who wins the auction concludes nothing about the value of
S, her bid does not determine the price she pays and she makes positive
expected profit from winning. She can therefore do no better than to bid
this expected value. So we have
βRRR (x) :=
{
b = w(x,R−1(b)) if R(θS) ≥ ES [v(x, S)]
ES [v(x, S)] if R(θS) ≤ ES [v(x, S)]
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